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Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and
Solicitation Rules Under Commercial
Speech and Antitrust Doctrine
By JUDITH L. MAUTE*
Introduction
The last ten years have wrought drastic changes upon the legal pro-
fession in America. Before then, federal intrusions on autonomous self-
regulation by state bar associations were rare. With isolated exceptions
regarding prospective clients' first amendment rights' and lawyers' polit-
ical speech,' state bar authorities could regulate attorney conduct with-
out fear of federal intervention even though the regulations had an
anticompetitive effect.3 The Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar,4 which held that minimum fee schedules for attorneys
violate the Sherman Antitrust Act,' signalled the end of this unbridled,
autonomous self-regulation. In subsequent decisions the Court has con-
tinued to undercut anticompetitive regulations of the profession, but it
has used the new First Amendment commercial speech doctrine rather
than antitrust law.6 In so doing, the Supreme Court has indirectly fos-
tered competition in the legal market, a market generally held immune
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma, A.B. Indiana University 1971,
J.D. University of Pittsburgh 1978, LL.M. Yale, 1982. The author is grateful to William Baer,
Esq., formerly of the general counsel's office of the Federal Trade Commission, to my col-
league Professor Teree Foster, and especially to my colleague Professor Barbara Blesner, who
generously commented on earlier drafts and shared valuable insights. My research assistant,
Ruth Brummet, University of Oklahoma class of 1987, and Douglas Moring, University of
Oklahoma reference librarian, provided needed research assistance. Any errors or omissions
are, of course, those of the author.
I. See, ag., Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
2. See, ag., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232 (1957); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
3. A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 679 (2d ed. 1984).
4. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
6. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977).
[4871
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
from direct antitrust attack because of the state action exemption to the
antitrust laws.
This Article explores the significance of the Court's decision to scru-
tinize anticompetitive regulation of attorney advertising and solicitation
under. the commercial speech doctrine rather than under the antitrust
laws. It asks, and starts to answer, several questions. Are the policies
underlying antitrust and commercial speech wholly dissimilar? Is the
Court's standard applied in antitrust actions all that different from its
test for restrictions on commercial speech? What effect has each doctrine
had on competition within the professions?
Although the two doctrines address a similar concern-competi-
tion-the commercial speech doctrine views competition in terms of a
number of values, whereas antitrust analysis focuses only on economic
values. In the short run, the use of the broader and newer doctrine of
commercial speech means that the standards for regulating attorney ad-
vertising and solicitation are less certain and predictable. To the extent
that the Supreme Court relies upon antitrust analysis as a starting point
in applying the commercial speech doctrine, the parameters of the law
may be developed smoothly enough. In the long term, the substantive
difference resulting from this choice of doctrine is perhaps not the more
significant result; rather, it is that enforcing regulation through the com-
mercial speech doctrine results in significant procedural differences. For
instance, application of antitrust law instead of commercial speech pro-
tection would affect the identity of enforcing parties, recoverability of
attorneys fees, and the availability of treble damage awards.7 The Article
suggests that the legal profession's legitimate concerns for self-regulation
and the public's interest in access to a full range of legal services may be
served better by the constitutional doctrine than by antitrust law.8
Part I identifies key issues relevant to comparing the two doctrines
and their probable impact on self-regulation. It compares the substantive
law of antitrust and commercial speech, their underlying policies, levels
of scrutiny and real or practical exemptions from scrutiny. It examines
commercial speech doctrine as applied to lawyer advertising and solicita-
tion, first with Supreme Court analysis of the issues, and then with cur-
rent developments concerning television advertising and direct mail
7. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
8. This assessment is based solely on the comparison between antitrust and commercial
speech law, and their projected impact on the legal profession. The resulting impact on overall
First Amendment doctrine is not a factor in that determination. Indeed, the author has serious
reservations about the entire commercial speech doctrine and its impact on the level of protec-
tion given to core First Amendment speech-the public debate necessary to our society's col-
lective struggle for self-determination in our system of government.
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solicitations, and finally, it raises questions about the nonsolicitation rule
adopted in the pending Rules of Professional Conduct. Part II explores
the significance of the doctrinal choice to protect lawyers' competitive
marketing activities through the commercial speech, and not the anti-
trust doctrine. It finds that the primary differences lie, not in the out-
come on particular marketing activities, but in the range of conduct
subject to review, the parties involved in the challenge, and the relevant
policies and procedures. The Article concludes by arguing that easing
restrictions on legitimate marketing activities by lawyers will enhance
consumer welfare by improving access to affordable and competent legal
services.
I. Doctrinal Choice: Antitrust or Commercial Speech?
Lawyers' ethical rules and the ethical rules and alleged anticompeti-
tive conduct of many other professional9 associations"° are scrutinized
under different doctrines. This anomaly is attributable to the institu-
tional position of state bar associations. In most jurisdictions, state laws
create, and bar associations and state supreme courts enforce, both li-
censing standards and ethical rules for lawyers.'" By contrast, for most
other professions, only licensing standards are statutory; their ethical
rules are generally adopted and enforced by private associations.' 2
This quasi-governmental status of state bar associations has brought
its activities within the "state action" exemption to antitrust laws. Under
the landmark Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Brown, 13 restraints on
competition are immune from antitrust attack to the extent they consti-
9. A "professional" is one who uses "intellectual and technical skills and knowledge that
have been obtained through a substantial investment in formal education and training." Kis-
sam, Antitrust Law and Professional Behavior, 62 Tax. L. REv. 1, 5 (1983).
I0. At one time most trade associations of trained professionals regarded themselves as
invulnerable to external regulation. This aura of immunity has begun to erode. Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedule established by state bar
stricken under antitrust analysis); United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339
U.S. 485 (1950) (price-fixing activities of brokers subject to antitrust scrutiny); American Med-
ical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (physicians not immune from Sherman Act § 3
liability).
11. See, e.g., Note, Arrow v. Dow: The Legacy of Lathrop-State Bars Under Attack 8
OKLA. CrrY U.L. REv. 89, 89 n.2 (1983).
12. See, eg., National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Benson
v. Arizona State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982) (state rental board
enforcing licensing restrictions); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp.
628 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (private architect association); United States v. Association of Eng'g
Geologists, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCII) % 66,349 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (private association of geolo-
gists formulating ethical regulations).
13. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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tute "state action or official action directed by a state."1 4 Underlying this
state action exemption was respect for state sovereignty, which only Con-
gress could abridge. 5 The Court found that in passing the Sherman An-
titrust Act, Congress did not intend to regulate the state when the state
was acting in its sovereign capacity.' 6 Rather, Congress intended to reg-
ulate only "persons,"- that is, businesses and individuals who operated
as monopolies. 17
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,'8 state-adopted legal ethics rules
were held to reflect a clear articulation of state policy, thus falling within
the Parker v. Brown exemption.' 9 The ethical rules of other professions,
however, to the extent they are not codified by the state, remain subject
to antitrust scrutiny.2° Lawyers' ethical rules concerning advertising and
solicitation are immune from antitrust attack under the state action ex-
emption. Nevertheless, precisely because they constitute state action
these ethical rules are subject to the constitutional constraints of the
commercial speech doctrine.
A. Antitrust Analysis
Consumer welfare and the efficient allocation of resources are two
primary goals of antitrust law.2' The post-Civil War era saw the rise of
large scale business enterprises, or "trusts," which were seen as threats
to consumers because of their dominant market positions and unfair
business practices. The Sherman Antitrust Act and other antitrust laws
were enacted to halt the spread of monopoly and to open markets to
competition.
The theory of antitrust law assumes that maximum consumer wel-
fare is achieved in a competitive marketplace, in which no participant or
group of participants has enough market power to reduce output in order
to charge higher than competitive prices.22 This concern for maximizing
consumer wealth excludes questions of how that prosperity is distributed
14. Id. at 351.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 350-51.
17. Id. at 351.
18. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
19. Id. at 356-57.
20. See, e.g., Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.C. Cir.
1979); United States v. Association of Eng'g Geologists, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 66,349
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (consent decree).
21. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 2 (1977); R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 8 (1978); H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW 41 (1985).
22. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 2-5.
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or used.23 By excluding any ethical component, it "permits consumers to
define by their expression of wants in the marketplace what things they
regard as wealth."
24
To achieve the goals of antitrust policy, courts apply either a per se
illegality standard or a "rule of reason" test, depending on the nature of
the challenged activity. The per se illegality standard applies to conduct
which so clearly restrains competition that courts can find it illegal with-
out engaging in complicated analysis.25 Price-fixing activities are espe-
cially vulnerable; whether a professional association sets minimum 26 or
maximum27 fees, such naked restraints on trade fall under a per se ille-
gality standard. Ethical rules that have lesser effects on competition are
also suspect, but are tested under the rule of reason. Under this stan-
dard, the courts inquire more deeply into the economic realities of the
affected market and measure the restraint's procompetitive effects against
its anticompetitive effects.28 Thus in applying the rule of reason, a court
would consider whether the ethical norms-given the totality of the cir-
cumstances-restrict or promote competition and, if competition is re-
strained, whether that restriction has a legitimate justification given the
available options.29
In antitrust litigation, the relevant issues are often highly technical
and require significant economic data to establish the alleged anticompe-
titive effect. To satisfy jurisdictional requirements, plaintiffs must show
that the challenged activity is "trade or commerce" within the statutory
ambit3 0 A professional association is likely to claim exemption from the
antitrust laws, either because it is a regulated industry,3 or because its
conduct is officially sanctioned by the state and thus shielded by the ab-
solute immunity of the state action exemption. 2
The sfate action exemption is, of course, most significant when con-
sidering whether to promote competition among lawyers via commercial
speech doctrine. Both regulations and private activity are exempt from
antitrust scrutiny if the state, acting in its sovereign capacity, adopts a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" policy to displace com-
23. R. BORK, supra note 21, at 90.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
26. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
27. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
28. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
29. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
30. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 708.
31. Id. at 743-44; see, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973); Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
32. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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petition.33 In most jurisdictions, this policy is inferred from the state
supreme court's delegation to the state bar association of extensive au-
thority to determine initial licensing standards and ethical rules.34 For
example, in Hoover v. Ronwin,35 the Arizona court rules authorized a bar
committee to examine and recommend applicants for admission, reserv-
ing for the court only the ultimate authority to grant or deny admission.
Because the court delegated authority and retained final power of super-
vision, allegedly anticompetitive bar passage decisions were held effec-
tively insulated from antitrust scrutiny. 36 The direct holding of Ronwin,
concerning licensing decisions, should have broad application to state-
licensed professions with member-dominated bodies authorized to make
admissions decisions. However, lawyers may be in a better position than
other professionals to extend the force of law to their ethical standards
and disciplinary actions.
Were the state action exemption not available to shield regulation of
competition among lawyers, their conduct would be evaluated by either
the rule of reason or the per se doctrine. Inhibitions on the competitive
process are primarily judged by a rule of reason by balancing the
procompetitive tendencies of the arrangement against any tendencies to
injure competition.37 An arrangement is an unreasonable restraint vio-
lating the Sherman Antitrust Act only when anticompetitive tendencies
dominate.3 s In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,39 the Supreme
Court gave perhaps the clearest exposition of the standards:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, re-
strains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the re-
straint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the re-
straint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.4
33. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982).
34. Note, supra note 11, at 89 n.2.
35. 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
36. Id. at 1997-98.
37. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 195-96.
38. Id. at 196.
39. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
40. Id. at 238.
The per se doctrine applies when experience shows that given con-
duct blatantly restricts competition, thus dispensing with the need for the
complex evidence and analysis required by the rule of reason.41 For ex-
ample, past experience has shown that price fixing is a naked restraint of
competition that automatically fails under per se doctrine. Most claims
of anticompetitive conduct by professional associations are evaluated
under the more complex rule of reason.4 2
The varying complexity of review under rule of reason or per se
analysis is not the only matter influencing the course of antitrust litiga-
tion. The identity of the parties seeking to enforce antitrust provisions
also influences the character of the litigation. The Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department can challenge anticompetitive conduct in civil
4 3
or criminal proceedings. 44 The Justice Department shares the enforce-
ment power with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Bureau of Com-
petition and with private parties claiming harm from the anticompetitive
conduct.4 5 Most professional activity is vulnerable to each of these en-
forcement mechanisms. 46 Because private enforcement often results in
class action suits, treble damage awards and attorneys fees, bar associa-
tions should, perhaps, give an immense sigh of relief that the state action
exemption precludes antitrust analysis of regulations for attorney adver-
tising and solicitation.47
41. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 196.
42. See, eg., National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Gold-
farb, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
43. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5 (1982) (Section 15 of Clayton Act); see L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 751-59.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982); see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 751-59.
45. Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1982), provides for Commission en-
forcement of sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1982) (sections 4
and 16 of the Clayton Act), grant private rights of action. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at
751 nn.6-7.
Currently the FTC shows the greatest active interest in lawyers' ethical rules restraining
advertising, see, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO
LEGAL SERVICES (1984). The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has also begun to
examine the restraints. See Letter from J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General of Anti-
trust Division, to chief justices of state supreme courts (Sept. 21, 1984) (copy on file in the
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Office).
46. See, eg., National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (civil
action by Justice Department); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (private class action for damages
and injunctive relief; American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), affid by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982) (civil action by FTC).
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B. Commercial Speech Doctrine
Commercial speech is "speech of any form that advertises a product
or service for profit or for business purpose."4 8 In the professional con-
text, its natural and immediate focus relates to conduct designed to ob-
tain clients. Thus, this doctrine reaches anticompetitive restrictions on
attorney advertising and solicitation. A wide range of commercial com-
munications are constitutionally protected, including simple advertising
of availability and prices for standardized legal services,49 advertising in-
tended to obtain clients for specific legal problems,5" and benign, nonpe-
cuniary solicitation."1
In contrast to antitrust law, which has had almost a century of de-
velopment,52 commercial speech doctrine was brought within First
Amendment protection in 1976." 3 Consequently, its parameters are still
in the formative stage, and will remain in a state of flux for some time
while the Supreme Court reacts to each new situation. The current ma-
jority of the Supreme Court justices appear to be opting for a case-by-
case approach instead of binding the Court to a predictably rigorous
scrutiny of state regulation.54 A practical result of choosing to use a new
doctrine, commercial speech, is uncertainty and thus unpredictability.
Given this uncertainty about future developments, the Supreme Court
might use antitrust as an analytical starting point. This would have the
advantage of increasing predictability since the Court would be able to
rely on established antitrust policies and analysis of commercial speech.
On the other hand, adoption of an antitrust analytical approach would
reduce flexibility: commercial speech considers a wide range of issues
including public debate, political association, and concepts of individual
and collective'autonomy, while antitrust is primarily concerned with
competition in the marketplace. Should the Court completely abandon
48. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & 3. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 923 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK].
49. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
50. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
51. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (commercial communication includes "speech pro-
posing a commercial transaction"); J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 923.
52. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 13.
53. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
54. This reticence may be partly attributable to a fear of returning to the substantive
economic due process of pre-1937, during which the Court set aside the economic judgments
of legislative bodies because the enacted regulations violated the Court's view of proper eco-
nomic regulations. J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 942. See also Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial
Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
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commercial speech in favor of an antitrust approach, it might lose the
ability to take broader issues into account.
Although the constitutional commercial speech doctrine undoubt-
edly has a tremendous impact on the competitive market for delivery of
legal services, the question remains: does it go far enough in protecting
commercial communications that would be protected as permissible mar-
ketplace activities under antitrust laws? It may be that the doctrine does
not reach the anticompetitive effects of rules against in-person solicita-
tion done under noncoercive circumstances for the lawyer's pecuniary
gain.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,56 which first applied the commercial
speech doctrine to lawyer advertising, was also the first case to hold that
the state action exemption insulated lawyers' ethical rules from antitrust
scrutiny. Until then, Sherman Antitrust Act challenges were a very real
possibility. 7 Indeed, the Court in Bates noted that allowing a "Sherman
Act challenge to the disciplinary rule would have precisely [the]... un-
desired effect" of diminishing state authority to regulate its professions.5 8
Since antitrust challenges have been brought against other professional
associations that restrict advertising, 9 there is no reason to believe that
restrictions on lawyer advertising would have escaped challenge were it
not for the Bates holding.
Advertising is only the first level of business-promoting communica-
tion to receive commercial speech protection. Eventually the Court may
have to confront what, if any, in-person solicitation of paying clients is
constitutionally protected. Both forms of business-promoting conduct
were banned under the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics' and the dis-
ciplinary rules of the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility.61 Adver-
tising is a group communication that informs the public-at-large of the
lawyer's generalized willingness to perform services. Solicitation, on the
other hand, involves a personal appeal directed to a prospective client.
But at least theoretically, advertising and solicitation are parts of the
same continuum. Moreover, the traditional distinction between the two
has blurred with technological capabilities that enable large scale, per-
55. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
56. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
57. See Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13
WILLAMETrE L.J 221, 247-71 (1977).
58. 433 U.S. at 360 n.11.
59. See, eg., American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 316, 325 (1953) (citing Canons of Professional Ethics,
Canons 27 & 46 (1951)).
61. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 193 n.1 (1982) and infra note 106.
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sonalized communications offering legal services to those who may need
them.
Lawyer advertising and solicitation have been reviewed only under
the commercial speech doctrine and not antitrust law. In traditional ad-
vertising cases, it may be that antitrust and commercial speech analysis
yield a similar result-the sustaining of ethical rules prohibiting false or
misleading advertising. In solicitation cases, however, antitrust analysis
may have a different effect. Professional rules proscribing solicitation
that are sustained under commercial speech analysis may be anticompeti-
tive under antitrust principles. Thus, the substantive reach of antitrust
and commercial speech law may not be fully coextensive.
1. The Developing Supreme Court Protection of Commercial Speech
Until a series of cases starting in 1973, the Supreme Court excluded
commercial speech from the scope of constitutional protection.' The
Court then did an about-face, rejecting the speech restrictive doctrine
and protecting the speaker and consumers' rights to say and hear truth-
ful messages about available products.63
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.'4 invalidated a statutory ban on advertising prescription
drug prices. The Court based its decision on the consuming public's
First Amendment interest in the free flow of truthful information about
lawful commercial activity.65 The state's legitimate interest in maintain-
ing professionalism of licensed pharmacists was insufficient to justify the
advertising ban because the ban did not directly affect professional stan-
dards.66 It appeared that the true purpose of the ban was to keep the
state's consuming public ignorant of the overhead costs imposed by
smaller, service-producing pharmacies. If consumers knew they could
get the drugs from low-cost, low-service pharmacies, the "professional"
pharmacist would be driven out of business, to the detriment of the phar-
macy profession and arguably the public.67
This paternalistic restriction of the flow of information to consumers
is inconsistent with a free market economy.68 Moreover, just as commer-
62. J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 926-29.
63. See generally, J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 925-43; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrru-
TIONAL LAW 651-56 (1978); Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment 1981
AM. BAR FOUND. R.J. 967.
64. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
65. Id. at 773.
66. Id. at 766, 770.
67. Id. at 770.
68. Id. at 765; J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 932.
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cial information
is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free en-
terprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelli-
gent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to
be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does
not serve that goal.69
In short, the Court found that commercial speech is part of the robust
public debate protected to enhance the public's autonomous choices
about how the system should be regulated.
2. Protection of Lawyers' Advertising as Commercial Speech
For the legal and medical professions, some hope remained that the
commercial speech doctrine would not extend to advertising by their
members. Virginia Pharmacy appeared to leave open the possibility for
bar associations to continue restricting attorney advertising without in-
terference. The Court expressly limited its commercial speech protection
to advertising by pharmacists. It reserved opinion as to advertising in
other professions, which it indicated could require analysis of very differ-
ent considerations. Lawyers "do not dispense standardized products;
they render professional services of almost infinite variety" with increased
possibility for confusion or deception from certain kinds of advertising.70
That possibility was short-lived; one year later, Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona 71 held that the state could not constitutionally prohibit publica-
tion of truthful advertisements concerning the availability and price
terms of routine legal services. In attempting to justify the ban, the
state's primary argument concerned professionalism.72 Price advertising
would induce commercialization, thus undermining lawyers' dignity and
self-worth; the "hustle of the marketplace" would negatively affect the
profession's service orientation; and client trust would be diminished if
the public perceived lawyers' profit motives.73
The Court rejected these arguments, finding "the postulated connec-
tion between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be
69. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 773 n.25 (emphasis in original).
71. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
72. The state asserted six arguments to justify the ban, claiming lawyer advertising:
would have an adverse effect on professionalism; is inherently misleading; would adversely
affect the administration of justice; would have undesirable economic effects; would adversely
affect the quality of service; and would present serious enforcement difficulties. Id. at 368-79.
73. Id. at 368.
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severely strained."74 Instead, the advertising ban reflected the profes-
sion's failure to meet community needs for legal services. Many persons
who have a legal problem do not hire lawyers because they are afraid of
high costs, or do not know how to obtain competent counsel. 75 Thus,
commercial speech analysis rejected the professionalism justification
based on the factual invalidity of the argument. In summarily conclud-
ing that the connection between advertising and reduced professionalism
was not proved, the Court in Bates appeared to at least consider the po-
tential legitimacy of the justification.
Although the holding in Bates is constitutionally based, Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion is replete with language analogous to anti-
trust analysis under the rule of reason. Under antitrust analysis also, the
Court would have rejected the "redeeming virtue" justification, based,
however, on its inherent illegitimacy rather than a factual invalidity. For
example, the Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States76 addressed safety-based arguments in justification of the
engineers' policy of refusing to participate in bidding processes. Under
the antitrust analysis applicable to the engineers' association, such qual-
ity-protection justifications were impermissible regardless of their valid-
ity because this justification was based on an inherent rejection of the
value of price competition.77 Similarly, Bates' rejection of the bar associ-
ation's claims of professionalism 7 was based on its belief in the inherent
value of both information dissemination to consumers 79 and market com-
petition.80 Under antitrust analysis, then, the justification would have
been illegitimate regardless of its factual validity, while under commer-
cial speech analysis, the justification, though apparently given the benefit
of fact-finding, was insufficient to justify the resulting restraint of
information.
The analogue between antitrust analysis and commercial speech
analysis is that both analyses may allow justifications for activity result-
ing in restrictions on price competition or information dissemination re-
spectively, as long as such justificaitons are not an inherent rejection of
74. At oral argument, counsel for Bates and Steen was more direct, noting that large law
firms operate as big businesses. "[To term them noncommercial is sanctimonious humbug."
Id. at 368 n.19.
75. Id. at 370. The Court noted three barriers to effective delivery of legal services to
lower and middle income consumers: (1) failing to recognize legal problems; (2) fear of high
prices; (3) not knowing how to obtain a competent lawyer. Id. at 370-71 nn.22-23.
76. 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
77. Id. at 694-95.
78. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-72.
79. Id. at 374.
80. Id. at 377.
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the underlying values of the doctrine: the antitrust doctrine's value of
price and quality competition and the First Amendment's value of the
free flow of information.
An even more direct parallel to antitrust analysis may be seen in the
Court's refusal to justify the advertising ban merely because price adver-
tising provides incomplete information necessary for prudent lawyer se-
lection. Paternalistic arguments based on the benefits of public ignorance
underestimate the public's ability to recognize the limits of advertising. 81
Instead, access to legal services for the middle seventy per cent of the
population could be enhanced by truthful disclosure of attorney fees
since consumers could overcome the "difficulty of discovering the lowest
cost seller of acceptable ability."82 The alternative transaction costs of
obtaining this information isolates lawyers from competition and reduces
the incentive for competitive pricing.83 Rather than increasing legal
costs by raising overhead, the Court opined, advertising could actually
reduce consumers' legal expenses.8 g Moreover, the advertising ban per-
petuates the market position of established lawyers, thus presenting a sig-
nificant entry barrier to the new competitor who has not yet had the
opportunity to develop business-generating contacts.85
This implicit recognition of antitrust policy as part of First Amend-
ment analysis was not uniformly accepted by the justices. In three sepa-
rate opinions, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stewart, and
Rehnquist dissented to that part of the opinion protecting lawyers' right
to advertise. Justice Powell (who was President of the American Bar
Association at the time the offending rules were adopted in the Code of
Professional Responsibility)86 expressed the prevailing sentiment "that
within undefined limits [the] decision will effect profound changes in the
practice of law, viewed for centuries as a learned profession."8 The re-
sulting weakening of courts' supervisory authority over the bar is not
required by the Constitution or the public interest.8 8 Price advertising
for "routine" services is deceptive because it disregards questions of qual-
ity and quantity of the service provided and makes facile assumptions
81. Id. at 374-75.
82. Id. at 377.
83. Id.
84. Id. Indeed, empirical data now exists to support that hypothesis. See infra text ac-
companying notes 225-226.
85. 433 U.S. at 378.
86. Bowman, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct: What Hath the ABA
Wrought?, 13 PAc. L.J. 273, 285-86 (1982).
87. 433 U.S. at 350.
88. Id.
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that services can be classified as routine.8 9 By contrast, Justice Powell
found nothing inherently misleading in advertising consultation charges
or hourly rates, provided that it was clear that the total charge to a client
would depend on the actual time required.90
Justice Rehnquist agreed that the Sherman Antitrust Act claim was
barred by the state action exemption, and he agreed with Powell's con-
cern that lawyer advertising was inherently misleading. However, he ex-
pressed a fundamental disagreement with protecting commercial speech.
Such protection would evaporate the distinctions between protected
speech and unprotected advertising speech and the Court would predict-
ably be relegated to ad hoc adjudications of advertisers' First Amend-
ment claims.91
Bates was the watershed for lawyer advertising. States around the
country heeded its invitation for help in defining the proper boundary
between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising:92 all states adopted
new rules to permit some form of lawyer advertising.9' Substantial con-
troversy existed over whether the case should be read broadly-to pro-
tect all advertising that was not false or misleading-or narrowly-to
protect only very limited and specific types of information contained in
advertisements.94 As a result, two alternatives evolved.95 The regulatory
approach opted for a narrow construction of Bates, limiting its First
Amendment protection of lawyer advertising. Adopted by thirty-one
states, and typified by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) amended Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-101, the rules specify the pre-
cise types of information permissible in advertising. Ironically, some
post-Bates amendments are so restrictive that they would prohibit the
very advertisement protected by the Court.96 By contrast, the nineteen
89. Id. at 392-95.
90. Id. at 399. With all respect for Justice Powell, advertising the specified hourly rate
without estimating total charge would not overcome middle and lower income persons' price
fears, and would continue to deprive clients-consumers of the opportunity to make informed
economic choices about the services they wish to purchase; the lawyer still retains substantial
power to determine how much time should be spent, and thus unilateral authority to deter-
mine the total fee charged.
91. Id. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 384.
93. Andrews, supra note 63, at 969.
94. Id. at 986-88.
95. Id.; Note, In re R.M.: Reassessing the Extension of First Amendment Protection to
Attorney Advertising, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 729, 742-45 (1983).
96. Id. at 971. This includes IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101,
which was the basis for discipline in Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565
(Iowa 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985), affid, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa
1985), appeal filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3565 (Feb. 11, 1986) (No. 85-1343), appeal dismissed, 54
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states adopting the directive approach read Bates broadly to protect
truthful competition in the legal marketplace. These rules merely pro-
hibit advertising that is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive, and
sometimes those which are self-laudatory or unfair.97 Not surprisingly,
the states choosing to adopt and enforce the restrictive rules have pro-
vided the cases for subsequent Supreme Court review. 98
Beginning with solicitation cases,99 the Court embarked on fact-spe-
cific, essentially ad hoc evaluation of state regulations under the commer-
cial speech doctrine. While the decisions have continued to be fact-
specific and narrowly drawn, "c° they have been framed within the general
guidelines of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission of New York.10 Central Hudson permits the state to ban speech
that is misleading or deceptive. To prohibit other commercial speech,
the state must have a substantial interest, and no less restrictive means
available to protect that interest. If, however, the state merely requires
an advertiser to provide the consumer with additional information, the
regulation need only be reasonably related to a substantial state inter-
est.102 While this case-by-case adjudication allows the Court carefully to
delineate permissible types of regulation, it does little to create a cogent
system of evaluating all types of commercial speech. As feared by Jus-
U.S.L.W. 3687 (April 21, 1986), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 174-197. See
Andrews, supra note 63, at 971 n.12.
97. See Andrews, supra note 63, at 988.
98. See, e.g., Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Humphrey, (discussed supra note 96, and infra
notes 174-197 and accompanying text); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct.
2265 (1985) (discussed infra notes 111-133 and accompanying text); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982) (discussed infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text).
99. See infra notes 141-185 and accompanying text (discussing solicitation of cases).
100. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 n.12 (1982).
101. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In CentralHudson, Justice Powell articulated a four-part test for
permissible state regulation of commercial speech: (1) The government may ban misleading or
deceptive speech or speech that is related to unlawful activity; (2) If the State seeks to regulate
protected commercial speech, it must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by the restric-
tions; (3) The regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest; and (4)
"The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal.
Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the re-
striction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's pur-
pose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive."
Id at 563-64.
Noncommercial speech protected by the First Amendment is not subject to content regu-
lation. Citing Bates, the Central Hudson Court found that commercial speakers are well-situ-
ated to evaluate the accuracy of messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity. Since
commercial speech arises out of economic self-interest, it is particularly resilient to overbroad
regulation. Id. at 564 n.6.
102. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2274 (1985).
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tices Rehnquist and Marshall,1"3 this ad hoc approach is creating doctri-
nal confusion and multiple tiers of scrutiny for commercial and other
forms of protected speech. This confusion will inevitably affect the de-
gree of protection given to core First Amendment speech.
The two post-Bates attorney advertising cases, In re R.M. 1o and
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,105 exemplify the Court's ad
hoc approach. Both cases involved restrictive, regulatory, post-Bates
amendments to the advertising rules. R.M.J. was a sole practitioner who
had recently entered practice in St. Louis; his efforts to attract a client
base gained the attention of bar authorities, who sought his disbarment.
The Missouri Supreme Court privately reprimanded him for including in
his advertisements information other than that explicitly permitted by
the amended rule and for mailing professional announcements to unau-
thorized persons. 06 The advertisements stated the jurisdictions in which
he was licensed to practice, including his admission to practice before the
United States Supreme Court, and the listed practice areas deviated from
the precise wording prescribed by the rule.
Justice Powell, who had dissented in Bates, wrote the opinion for the
Court, unanimously reversing the state's reprimand. The state discipli-
nary committee had identified no substantial interests supporting its
strict regulation of the language used to advertise fields of practice or the
jurisdictions in which a lawyer is licensed to practice.1 7 Although the
attorney's statement that he was admitted to practice before the Supreme
Court was uninformative, in bad taste, and possibly misleading, the lower
court did not determine that such information was potentially misleading
103. See, e.g., Justice Rehnquist's concerns voiced in dissents in Bates, 433 U.S. at 404-05,
and Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 584-607, and Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 474 n.5 (1978).
104. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
105. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
106. This violated the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(A) (2)
(1979), which permits sending announcements only to "lawyers, clients, former clients, per-
sonal friends, and relatives." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 198. This is a provision the author
fondly refers to as the "country club" exception to the nonsolicitation rule because it allows
established lawyers to construe broadly "personal friends" while unduly hampering the ability
of new entrants to make known their availability to persons who may need their services.
107. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205-06. Note 15 quotes in full the Central Hudson test (see
supra note 101). Id. at 203. Later the Court refers to the absence of record evidence that the
prohibition of a general announcement mailing resulted from failed efforts to proceed along a
"less restrictive path." Id. In Zauderer, the Court claims the least restrictive alternative test
applies only to prohibitions of commercial speech, and not to restrictions that require more
speech. 105 S. Ct. at 2282 n. 14. At present, it is unclear whether that distinction applies to all
forms of commercial speech, or whether it is specially created in response to regulatory con-
cerns for professional advertising.
and thus could not form the basis for discipline.1"' Finally, the Court
examined the state's rule limiting the class of persons to whom attorneys
could mail professional announcements. Absent proof that the rule was
the least restrictive solution available to enforcement authorities, R.M.J.
could not be disciplined for its violation. 109
In re R.MJ. indicates the Supreme Court's intention to communi-
cate clearly to state regulatory authorities that it will carefully evaluate
state regulations that restrict the flow of useful, truthful information to
legal consumers. In deference to professionalism concerns (and collegial
self-interest) the Court might have articulated hypothetical state interests
to justify the prohibitions. It might have overlooked deficiencies in the
record and findings below. Instead, the Court required the state to sub-
stantiate fully its legitimate interests in restricting the flow of information
and to show how the regulations furthered those interests.
The unanimity of In re R.MJ. and the choice of Justice Powell as
the Court's voice are significant. Only four short years before, the Court
was sharply divided on the basic issue of lawyer advertising, with Justice
Powell articulating the professionalism concerns of state and national bar
organizations. Although the opinion was narrowly drafted to provide for
case-by-case adjudication, the message was still clear: lawyer advertising
is here to stay and efforts to deprive consumers of useful information will
be closely scrutinized. l 0
The Court allowed three years for the states and lower courts to
react to this message. Then, in the 1985 Term, it decided Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel."' Although it struck absolute prohibi-
tions on advertising, the Court for the first time sustained a bar's disci-
plining of a lawyer for violating its advertising rules." 2 The Court
modified its message from R.MJ.: it would still closely scrutinize out-
right bans on forms of commercial speech, however, it would be more
lenient in its treatment of rules requiring attorney advertisements to dis-
close additional information. The tenor of the message also changed: the
Court did not hold the state to the same strict burden of proof as in
R.MJ., and overlooked deficiencies in the record and proceedings below
108. 455 U.S. at 205-06.
109. Id. For example, requiring filing of all general mailings could address some enforce-
ment concerns, and public fear of mail from lawyers could be avoided with a required disclo-
sure on the envelope that "This is an Advertisement." Id. at 206 and n.20.
110. But see Note, 32 CATH. U.L. Rrv., supra note 95, at 754-58 which reads In re R.M.J.
less optimistically, and as implying that "states have a per se substantial interest in regulating
all forms of commercial speech by attorneys, requiring only that the regulations be narrowly
drawn." Id. at 757.
111. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
112. Id. at 2284.
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in order to sustain the limited discipline of public reprimand.' 1
3
Zauderer acknowledged that print advertising is a form of solicita-
tion: a communication directed to obtaining specific types of claims or
clients." 4 Distinctions between personal and written solicitation involve
only a question of degree. The Court moved toward the center of the
controversy over permissible methods of promoting legal business. Pre-
dictably, there was division among the Justices over the issue. Justice
White wrote the opinion for what can best be described as a shifting
majority. Only Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in the full opinion.
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in those parts of the opinion invali-
dating the state prohibitions, while Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist,
and Chief Justice Burger joined in those parts of the opinion sustaining
the discipline for failure to disclose additional information.' 5 The cen-
tral divisions revolved around two interrelated questions: how much def-
erence should the commercial speech doctrine grant the state as
sovereign, and how much more deference is warranted when the state is
regulating lawyers as a professional group with greater societal
obligations."
6
Zauderer had placed two newspaper advertisements that attracted
the attention of the bar authorities. The first advised readers that
Zauderer's firm would represent defendants in drunk driving cases and
that "[f]ull legal fees [would be] refunded if [they were] convicted of
drunk driving.""' 7 Two days after the ad's first appearance, the Ohio
disciplinary office told Zauderer that the ad appeared to offer representa-
tion of a criminal matter on a contingent fee basis, which violated DR 2-
106(C). Zauderer withdrew the ad, apologized, and agreed to decline
employment offered as a result of the ad. The second advertisement in-
cluded an accurate drawing of a Dalkon Shield, with text indicating the
types of problems the device allegedly caused. It advised the reader not
to "assume it is too late to take legal action," that the firm was handling
some such cases on a contingent fee basis, and that "[i]f there is no recov-
ery, no legal fees are owed.""' 8 Prior to publication he sought and was
denied an advisory statement from the disciplinary office as to whether
the ad was ethically objectionable.' ' 9
113. Id. at 2282-84.
114. Id. at 2276-77.
115. Justice Powell did not participate in consideration or decision of the case.
116. See, e.g., 105 S. Ct. at 2281-83, 2276-80.
117. Id. at 2271 (brackets in original).
118. Id. at 2271-72.
119. Id. at 2289 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The state bar subsequently initiated administrative proceedings,
which found four disciplinary violations. The Supreme Court of Ohio
affirmed and issued a public reprimand. First, Zauderer had accepted
employment in Dalkon Shield cases after giving unsolicited legal advice.
This violated DR 2-103(A), prohibiting solicitation. Second, the drawing
violated the proscription against illustrations, contained in DR 2-101(A).
Third, Zauderer failed to disclose that clients might be liable for litiga-
tion costs in a contingent fee matter. This violated DR 2- 101(A), which
prohibits false, misleading, or deceptive communications, and DR 2-
101(B)(15), which requires that attorneys charging contingent fees dis-
close whether percentages are charged before or after costs. Finally, the
drunk driving advertisement was found potentially deceptive because it
did not mention that the client could be found guilty of a lesser offense
and remain liable for fees. 120
The majority opinion restated the Central Hudson test. It found
that Ohio failed to meet its burden of showing that the ban on legal ad-
vice and illustrations directly advanced substantial state interests
through the least restrictive means available. 121
Zauderer could not be disciplined for soliciting business with
printed advertisements "containing truthful and nondeceptive informa-
tion and advice" regarding a specific legal problem of potential clients. 122
Unlike the ban of in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain sustained in
Chralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 123 this form of solicitation presents
little risk of overreaching or coercion. Ohio claimed that the ban was
needed to prevent litigation because of serious regulatory problems in
distinguishing between deceptive and nondeceptive legal advice. The
Court, however, found Zauderer's statements "easily verifiable and com-
pletely accurate." '124 Assessing the potential for deception in legal advice
and information is comparable in complexity to that regularly done by
the FTC in evaluating other types of advertising. 125 Regulatory burdens
do not justify suppression of truthful and nondeceptive advertising be-
cause recent commercial speech decisions are:
120. Id. at 2273. The administrative trial panel accepted a change in theory after the mat-
ter was tried on the original theory, that the ad was deceptive because it violated the proscrip-
tion against contingent fees in criminal matters. Id. at 2272, 2292-93 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 2276, 2278-79.
122. Id. at 2276-77, 2280.
123. 436 U.S. 477 (1978). See infra notes 134-157 and accompanying text.
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[G]rounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial informa-
tion is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators
the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful
from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.... Pro-
phylactic restraints that would be unacceptable as applied to com-
mercial advertising generally are therefore equally unacceptable as
applied to appellant's advertising.' 26
The state's ban on illustrations also failed the Central Hudson test.
The Court interpreted the rule to require that lawyer advertising be dig-
nified. It then found no substantial state interest in maintaining dignified
lawyer communications, and undignified behavior too infrequent to war-
rant a prophylactic rule. Nor is identifying deceptive or manipulative
uses of visual content so burdensome that the state can resort to the more
restrictive alternative of a blanket ban on illustrations. The FTC has
shown it is possible to identify and suppress visually deceptive advertis-
ing. Because this can be done on a case-by-case basis, Zauderer could
not be disciplined for using an accurate, nondeceptive illustration despite
Ohio's prophylactic rule."12
A new majority, comprised of Justices White, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, now joined by O'Connor, Burger, and Rehnquist, sustained the
public reprimand on two bases. First, in the Dalkon Shield advertise-
ment, Zauderer failed to inform prospective clients that they might be
liable for litigation costs, an additional disclosure allegedly required by
the rules. Second, Ohio's change in theory did not deny him procedural
due process, even though it resulted in a finding that the drunk driving
advertisement was deceptive.
The first basis may portend a change in the Court's attitude, at least
toward compelled commercial speech and the degree of deference to
which professional regulation is entitled. Because the informational
value to consumers is the primary justification for protecting commercial
speech, compelled disclosure of commercial information is less rigorously
126. Id. at 2279-80. Justices O'Connor, Burger, and Rehnquist dissented from that portion
of the opinion invalidating the prohibition on legal advice in advertisements. Absent such a
rule, exigencies of the marketplace will encourage lawyers to present that advice in the manner
most likely to attract clients. State regulation of professional advice in advertisements is enti-
tled to greater deference than regulation of claims regarding commercial goods. Ohio could
reasonably determine that use of unsolicited legal advice poses a sufficient threat to substantial
state interests to justify a blanket prohibition. Id. at 2296.
127. Id. at 2295. Justices O'Connor, Burger, and Rehnquist concurred in the judgment
that discipline could not be imposed for the illustration. The regulatory burden is not so great
as to warrant a complete ban of illustrations in print advertisements, although they and the
majority expressed no view as to potential regulatory burdens from broadcast media advertise-
ments. Id. at 2294 n.1.
scrutinized than compulsion to disclose noncommercial information.1 2 8
By contrast, compelled disclosure of additional information could have
anticompetitive effects. First, increased advertising costs could chill
some advertisements. Second, if compelled disclosure practically dictates
that everyone provide the same information, such rules could chill legiti-
mate differentiation over the legal services offered by the advertising
practitioners.1 29 The advertiser's rights are "adequately protected as
long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's in-
terest in preventing deception of consumers."1 3 °  Here, the ad was po-
tentially deceptive because it left the impression that if there was no
recovery, the client would owe nothing.13 1
In sustaining the public reprimand for Zauderer's failure to make
disclosures, the majority may be signalling to states a new willingness to
uphold certain advertising regulations without the exacting scrutiny of
the Central Hudson test. Although the rule in Zauderer was not nar-
rowly drawn and did not specify what information the attorney was re-
quired to disclose, the Court nevertheless upheld it.1 3z This ad hoc
decision suggests unprincipled lenience toward poorly drafted rules and
sloppy regulatory efforts. As such, it defeats the concern for predictabil-
ity in the drafting and interpretation of advertising and solicitation rules.
Notwithstanding this criticism, the lenient treatment of the state's
rules compelling disclosure signifies the Court's reaffirmance of the prin-
ciple that in commercial speech, more information is better than less. By
characterizing the invalid illustration ban as part of a more general con-
cern for manipulative uses of visual media, the Court begins to suggest a
possible analysis for broadcast media regulations. Similarly, rejecting the
hypothetical state interest that advertisements be "dignified" portends an
128. Id. at 2281.
129. The author's informal survey of newspaper advertising suggests very little difference
in the substance of what is communicated in much lawyer advertising.
130. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
131. Id. at 2283. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented to this portion of the Court's
opinion, which they believe "greatly overstates the distinction between suppression and disclo-
sure"; while the "least restrictive means" analysis is inapplicable to commercial speech disclo-
sure requirements, the requirements "may extend no further than 'reasonably necessary' to
serve" substantial state interests. Id. at 2285-86 nn.l-2. Although they agree the State could
require some disclaimer concerning costs to avoid potential misunderstanding, the record does
not establish that Zauderer's ad was specifically covered by DR 2-102(B)(15), which provides
clear, advance notice of the precise disclosures required, nor does the record indicate the sub-
stantial state interest served by the various possible disclosures. The sanction violates basic
due process and First Amendment guarantees. Id. at 2287-93.
132. Unfortunately, the Ohio court did not precisely identify the required disclosures,
which made it difficult to evaluate Zauderer's claim that the disclosures would be burdensome
and chill advertising of contingent fees. Id. at 2283 n.15.
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attitude that consumers must be trusted to make their own rational dis-
criminations about a lawyer's advertising. To some lawyers any advertis-
ing is undignified and professionally demeaning. '33 Their sensibilities
cannot control the flow of truthful information to the consuming public.
Also important was the Court's reference to the FTC's ability to
judge false or misleading advertisements. This suggests that the Court
expects to hold state disciplinary agencies to the same level of regulatory
expertise demonstrated by the FTC in regulating lawyer's commercial
speech. Given that state disciplinary agencies have responsiblity for po-
licing the full range of lawyer misconduct, while the FTC has a more
limited focus, an expectation of comparable expertise could greatly re-
strict bar authorities' policing of advertising.
Finally, Zauderer steadily proceeds toward the center of another is-
sue of commercial speech-the advertising-solicitation controversy. In
acknowledging that even print advertisements are a form of solicitation,
it challenges facile assumptions that clear lines separate the two. This
raises questions about the nonsolicitation principle.
3. Solicitation as Commercial Speech
Since the 1908 Canons, both advertising and solicitation were pro-
hibited forms of securing new legal business. Solicitation, as direct com-
munication with prospective clients, was regarded with greater distaste
than advertising and thus was flatly prohibited. Thus far, Supreme Court
commercial speech decisions have maintained the distinction between the
two forms of lawyers' commercial speech, sustaining an outright ban on
certain in-person solicitation, while carefully scrutinizing advertising
rules. As Zauderer indicates, modem forms of communicating to large
numbers of persons in a targeted population make this line increasingly
difficult to draw.
Both advertising and solicitation could have procompetitive effects
in the legal marketplace. Unrestricted lawyer communications would
give service-providers access to consumers in need of specified legal serv-
ices. Resulting matches between lawyers with specific skills and clients
needing those skills could enhance consumer welfare by increasing access
to the legal system. Nevertheless, such potential for procompetitive effect
carries less weight under commercial speech doctrine than it would
under antitrust law.
133. See, e.g., statement of Chief Justice Burger to ABA Commission on Professionalism.
"He would 'dig ditches' before resorting to advertising." "[M]y advice to the public is-never,
never, never, under any circumstances, engage the services of a lawyer who advertises." Tay-
lor, Update: Lawyer Advertising, 11 LITIGATION NEWS 3 (1985).
The Supreme Court examined solicitation in Chralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association '34 and In re Primus.'35 The opinions demonstrate on the
one hand the potential range of activities which may be considered law-
yer solicitation, and on the other, the concerns underlying antisolicita-
tion rules. Chralik exemplifies the concern for protecting consumers
from fraud, overreaching and intimidation, which can force prospective
clients into choosing a lawyer before they can make an informed deci-
sion. Antitrust and commercial speech law are parallel in this respect.
Yet, commercial speech doctrine encompasses a broader range of con-
cerns. Ohralik upheld restrictions which were partly justified to protect
clients from conflicts of interest or underrepresentation, professional val-
ues that do not fit strictly in a market analysis focused on economic bene-
fits from competition. In one respect, In re Primus involves rights of
political association, yet at a deeper level it respects the capacity of the
individual to choose a lawyer autonomously when not subjected to im-
proper pressures. In an abstract sense, these two diverse cases reflect the
fundamental values of autonomy and self-determination that underlie
much First Amendment analysis.
Factually, the two cases are polar opposites. Chralik involved a per-
sonal injury lawyer who visited two young automobile accident victims
in the hospital and again just after their release. The lawyer persuaded
the driver of one car to retain him; despite an apparent conflict of inter-
est, he then visited the other victim, a passenger in the same car. He
recorded the conversations without the victims' knowledge or permis-
sion. A lawyer of ordinary prudence should have questioned whether
either woman was capable of making a reasoned, informed decision
about retaining a lawyer at that time.' 36 When they subsequently dis-
charged him, he sued one and received a settlement from the other for
breach of contract. The Ohio Supreme Court ordered the lawyer's indefi-
nite suspension.
In re Primus'37 involved quite different circumstances, character-
ized by Justice Marshall as "'solicitation' . . . in accordance with the
highest standards of the legal profession."' 38 The case involved a private
practitioner who was a volunteer worker for a local ACLU branch and a
paid consultant for a local nonprofit group. In the latter capacity, she
complied with a request to meet with a group of women to discuss their
134. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
135. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
136. 436 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring).
137. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
138. 436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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legal rights. The women had been sterilized as a condition of their con-
tinued receipt of public medical assistance. 139 When the attorney heard
that one woman wished to fie suit, she wrote to advise the woman that
the ACLU had offered to file suit, without charge, on her behalf. The
South Carolina Supreme Court found that the conduct was improper so-
licitation and warranted public reprimand.
Writing for the Court in both Chralik and Primus, Justice Powell's
opinions signalled the Court's shift toward ad hoc consideration of
whether the lawyer's speech was constitutionally protected." Only Jus-
tice Marshall's concurring opinion tried to draw a principled distinction
between the cases. He explicitly focused on the Bates concern with pro-
moting consumer welfare with truthful information facilitating informed
consumer decisionmaking.
The distinctly different facts called for distinctly different constitu-
tional analyses. Ohralik's in-person solicitation of remunerative employ-
ment was a business transaction with speech as an essential but
subordinate component. It was therefore protected by the commercial
speech doctrine, but entitled to less rigorous scrutiny than the print ad-
vertising in Bates. Because the solicitation was done in person, it created
opportunities to pressure the prospective clients to respond immediately,
without allowing time to reflect or to compare other available services.14 '
Ohralik conceded the state's compelling interest in preventing the risks
of fraud, undue influence, overreaching, and vexatious conduct from so-
licitation. Thus, the only question was whether the state could constitu-
tionally apply its broad prophylactic rule absent a showing of actual
harm. 42 Affirming the sanction imposed below, the Court found the so-
licitation ban justified. Given the danger of overreaching when a lawyer,
skilled in the art of persuasion, "personally solicits an unsophisticated,
injured, or distressed lay person" and the difficulties of proving what ac-
tually occurred during the face-to-face meeting, effective self-regulation
justifies a prophylactic rule designed to prevent potential harm.' 43 As
Justice Powell noted, Ohralik holds that the state may constitutionally
proscribe in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under circumstances
likely to result in adverse consequences. 44
139. 436 U.S. at 415.
140. In fact, Ohralik signalled the Court's shift from the clearer constitutional emphasis of
Bates, decided earlier in the year, to the murkier ad hoc analysis of later commercial speech
cases. See supra notes 99-105, 132 and accompanying text.
141. 436 U.S. at 458.
142. Id. at 463-65.
143. Id. at 466.67.
144. Id. at 464.
The Court's reasoning in Ohralik is analogous to the per se illegality
standard of antitrust, which enables courts to declare conduct illegal
when it is inherently anticompetitive. Because coercive solicitation, his-
torically viewed with disapproval,145 carries an inherent potential for
abuse, the Court found it reasonable "to presume that in-person solicita-
tion by lawyers ... [is] injurious to the person solicited." 146 This pre-
sumption of injury amounts to a finding that coercive solicitation is so
inherently detrimental as to be per se proscribable, notwithstanding the
commercial speech doctrine.
While an outright ban of certain forms of in-person, commercial so-
licitation is permissible under the commercial speech doctrine, the solici-
tation in Primus involved political association, which deserves the
generous protection reserved for core First Amendment rights.14 7 Broad
prophylactic rules are inappropriate; state regulations must be narrowly
drafted to further a compelling state interest. The means of advancing
that interest must be to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational
freedoms.148 Primus could not be disciplined constitutionally unless her
activity actually involved the type of misconduct towards which the law-
ful prohibition was directed. 49 Because the solicitation by letter was not
misleading, overbearing, or deceptive, it was not within the state's legiti-
mate regulatory interests and the discipline could not stand.150
The deference to political association demonstrated by Primus has
an antitrust counterpart: the state action exemption. Political speech is
exempt from commercial speech review,' 5 ' that is, it receives the fullest
First Amendment protection rather than the limited protections of com-
mercial speech.' 52 Because "[t]he principle of freedom of speech springs
from the necessities of . . . self-government,"' 1 3 many commentators
would accord the highest First Amendment protection to political
speech.' 54 State action is exempt from antitrust review when the state
145. Id. at 454.
146. Id. at 466 (footnote omitted).
147. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 432-33.
148. Id. at 432-34.
149. Id. at 434-35.
150. Id. at 439.
151. Cf Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 15 (1979) (defining commercial speech as speech without polit-
ical significance).
152. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring).
153. A. MEIKLEOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).
154. See, eg., BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 300 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971).
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operates in its governmental capacity.1 55  In short, both commercial
speech and antitrust analysis defer to the necessary requirements of gov-
ernment: the need of people to acquire information critical to their par-
ticipation in democratic government, and the need of the state for
freedom from restrictions when it acts on behalf of that government.
Taken at the most simplistic level, Ohralik and Primus could be seen
as describing the outer parameters of permissible solicitation: the state
may constitutionally prohibit any solicitation motivated by a lawyer's pe-
cuniary interests, but may not sanction any solicitation done to further
political association unless the solicitation was actually misleading, over-
bearing, or deceptive.1 56 This reading is reflected in Rule 7.3 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 7.3 prohibits soliciting em-
ployment from a prospective client "when a significant motive for the
lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain." '157 Two factors raised
in Primus and in Justice Marshall's concurring opinion cast doubt on
such a broad reading. These questions relate to the particular fee ar-
rangement and the form of communication by which the solicitation took
place.
The first factor involves the fee arrangement in Primus. ACLU pol-
icy during the pendency of Primus prohibited cooperating lawyers from
receiving any award of counsel fees for services rendered in ACLU-
sponsored litigation. 5 ' However, ACLU national policy subsequently
changed to allow local chapters to experiment with fee-sharing arrange-
ments. The Court expressed no opinion on the impact such a policy
would have on its analysis of the constitutional principles involved.159
Dicta suggested a possible difference between traditional fee arrange-
ments, in which the client pays the lawyer, and court-awarded fees,
which are available only in limited circumstances, at the court's discre-
155. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
156. That portion of the Primus opinion also provided that "[sltates may insist that lawyers
not solicit on behalf of lay organizations that exert control over the actual conduct of any
ensuing litigation." 436 U.S. at 440, 472.
157. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983) (hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES), Direct Contact with Prospective Clients, provides in full:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-
person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the law-
yer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in-person, by telephone or
telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific
recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed
generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by the
lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find
such services useful.
158. 436 U.S. at 430 n.24.
159. Id.
tion, and often in smaller amounts.160 If this difference is significant,
future decisions may grant some protection to law firms that non-
coercively solicit clients for certain types of "public interest" litigation
despite lawyers' potential pecuniary interest in court-awarded fees. This
protection could have its greatest impact in class actions brought under a
private attorney general theory: it might permit class certification which
would otherwise be barred by counsel's allegedly unethical conduct in
soliciting class members.
16 1
The second factor limiting the broad application of prophylactic an-
tisolicitation rules concerns the method of communication involved in
Primus. Just as the fee arrangement removed the lawyer's financial in-
centive for overbearing conduct, so the form of communication lessened
the opportunity for improper conduct and subjected it to effective review
by regulatory authorities. The letter merely provided information mate-
rial to making an informed decision in deciding whether to pursue litiga-
tion. In contrast to in-person solicitation, the letter allowed time to
deliberate, was not a significant invasion of privacy, was not misleading,
and did not afford significant opportunity for coercion or overreach-
ing. 162 Because the communication was in writing, a permanent record
remained for later regulatory review.1 63 Reliable proof is available to es-
tablish precisely what was said so the words can be evaluated as to
whether they are false, misleading or deceptive. 61  This opportunity for
retroactive policing by bar authorities may justify treating solicitation by
letter differently from in-person solicitation. Some federal and state
courts have apparently found this factor significant enough to afford con-
stitutional protection to targeted direct mail solicitation. 16  The argu-
ment may be persuasive to the Supreme Court when it faces this
question.' 66
160. Id. at 430-31.
161. Comment, Class Certification: Relevance of Plaintiff's Finances and Fee Arrangements
With Counsel, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 70, 88-92 (1978).
162. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434-36.
163. Id. at 435-36.
164. This is in direct contrast to the inherent enforcement difficulties presented by in-per-
son solicitation. See Ohralik; 436 U.S. at 467-68.
165. See, e.g., Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, No. 84 C 3548,
slip op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 1985); Spencer v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Ct. of Pa., 579 F.
Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 27, 470 A.2d 235 (1984);
In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2704 (1985). But
see, Leoni v. State Bar of California, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985),
appeal dismissed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3560 (Feb. 24, 1986) (sustained public reprimand for targeted
direct mailing which was misleading or deceptive).
166. See infra notes 200-210 and accompanying text.
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4. Current and Future Developments
The Supreme Court's current commitment to ad hoc determination
of commercial speech restrictions is not the only reason for uncertainty
in the area of regulation of attorney advertising and solicitation. After
Bates, all states amended their rules, but there is virtually no uniformity
among the amendments. Local norms and sensibilities are incorporated
in the actual rules, and before adopting a marketing program a lawyer
should carefully investigate the local regulatory climate. 167
Nevertheless, it is possible to make some generalizations about the
current state of lawyer commercial speech. State courts, however reluc-
tantly, seem to have accepted the central teaching of Bates that the state
cannot constitutionally ban the use of print media for disseminating
truthful, nondeceptive commercial information about lawyers.168 En-
forcement activities are now directed towards print advertisements that
are potentially deceptive or misleading. 69 However, the scope of permis-
sible regulation of advertising content 170 and time, place or manner re-
strictions remain unclear.
17 1
As this article was in press, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed
two appeals from state court decisions sustaining advertising restrictions.
Summary disposition of one case, Leoni v. State Bar of California,"7 2 is
unsurprising, since the state court found the massive directed mailings
were actually misleading. Dsimissal of Humphrey cannot be so easily
explained. A summary disposition for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion is technically a decision on the merits with some precedential value.
167. Ross, The Barriers to Lawyer Advertising, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 16, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
168. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Schaffer, 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1982); In re
Marcus, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982).
169. See, e.g., In re Sekerez, 458 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 182 (1984)
(litany of misconduct included improper trade name, false advertisements, neglect and aban-
donment of client matters; disbarment warranted).
170. An issue now germinating in the lower courts concerns mandatory disclaimer of ex-
pertise or quality of services. See, e.g., Mezrano v. Alabama State Bar, 434 So. 2d 732 (Ala.
1983) (improperly used trade name and failed to disclaim quality or expertise; suspension); In
re Johnson, 341 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1983) (admonition vacated because rule prohibiting ad-
vertisement of legitimate national certification is unconstitutionally overbroad). Because con-
sideration of specialization is ongoing by state bar authorities, see MODEL RULE 7.4(c), the
Supreme Court will likely defer to state judgment until there is sufficient experience with
which to evaluate the impact of resulting rules on the flow of truthful information. Daves v.
State Bar of Texas, 691 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985) (held the required disclaimer of
specialization valid, but the six month suspension was an abuse of discretion).
171. See, e.g., Mezrano v. Alabama State Bar, 434 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1983) (rule requires
copies of all advertisements to be sent to the state bar within three days of first publication).
172. 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985), appealfiled, 54 U.S.L.W.
3463 (Dec. 23, 1985), dismissed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3560 (Feb. 24, 1986).
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However, as elsewhere, the message is ambiguous. 173 Zauderer, where
discipline was sustained with some leniency by the Court, and now these
two prompt, summary dismissals might be seen as a retrenchment from
expanding commercial speech protection. In any event, the Court clearly
has not yet developed a consensus on the proper balance in this sensitive
area. Quite possibly it has suspended development of the doctrine to
await input from the states. Some predict Humphrey will have little im-
pact because television advertising is a "closed chapter" in most states;
only a few states have rules as restrictive as Iowa's and others are un-
likely to amend their rules to tighten up on television advertising. 174 On
the other hand, since most states are now actively evaluating proposed
changes to the ethical rules, they might well interpret these cases as a
basis for more restrictive rules. In all probability, these summary dismis-
sals are not the last word on directed mailings and television advertising.
a. Television Advertising
Prevailing Supreme Court commercial speech rulings render suspect
any outright ban on the use of normal communication channels except
in-person communications under specific coercive circumstances. Televi-
sion is so pervasive a mode of communication that no message can be
expected to reach large numbers of the American public without it. Con-
sequently, a blanket restriction on television advertising would probably
not be the type of narrow regulation permitted by Central Hudson.175
Nevertheless, in Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey,'76 the
Iowa Supreme Court upheld stringent restrictions on television
advertising.
Humphrey addresses the extent to which the state may constitution-
ally regulate electronic media advertising by dictating allowable content
and prohibiting variations on the manner of presentation. Iowa Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(B) adopts the regulatory approach
and lists twenty specific items that can be communicated in advertise-
173. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 757-58 (1983); Note, The Precedential
Effect of Summary Affirmances and Dismissals for Want of a Substantial Federal Question, 64
VA. L. REv. 117 (1978); Note, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the Supreme Court
for Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 76 COL.
L. REV. 508 (1976).
174. Nat'lL.J., May 5, 1986, at 27.
175. See Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 470 A.2d 228 (1984) (interpreted
post-Bates amendment's silence on television advertising not to impose blanket, restriction).
See also J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 933-34.
176. 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985), afi'd,
377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), appealfiled, 54 U.S.L.W. 3565 (Feb. 11, 1986) (No. 85-1343),
appeal dismissed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3687 (April 21, 1986).
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ments. It then requires that the information conveyed via television be
"articulated by a single nondramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and
with no other background sound ... [and] no visual display shall be
allowed except that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer." 177
177. IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (A) & (B) provide:
(A) A lawyer shall not, on the lawyer's own behalf, or that of a partner, associ-
ate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, use, or partici-
pate in the use of, any form of public communication which contains any false,
fraudulent, misleadihg, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement, which contains
any statement or claim relating to the quality of the lawyer's legal services, which
appeals to the emotions, prejudices, or likes or dislikes of a person, or which contains
any claim that is not verifiable; nor shall the lawyer use or participate in the use of
any form of public communication, calculated to attract clients for the lawyer's pecu-
niary gain, which contains any information not hereafter specifically permitted. In
all communications under DR 2-101 and DR 2-102 the lawyer may use restrained
subjective characterizations of rates or fees such as "reasonable," "moderate," and
"very reasonable," but shall avoid all unrestrained subjective characterizations of
rates or fees, such as, but not limited to, "cut-rate," "lowest," "give-away," "below-
cost," and "special." The lawyer shall further avoid the use of all signs and symbols
such as, but not limited to, logos, trademarks, graphics, design work, and pictures.
(B) The following information, in words and numbers only, may be communi-
cated to the public in newspapers, periodicals, trade journals, "shoppers" and other
similar advertising media, published and disseminated in the geographic area in
which the lawyer maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clien-
tele resides or in the classified advertising section of the telephone directory distrib-
uted in the geographic area in which the lawyer maintains offices or in which a
significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides or in reputable legal directories gener-
ally available in such area. The same information may be communicated by direct
mail. The same information, in words and numbers only, articulated only by a single
nondramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and with no other background sound, may
be communicated by radio. The same information, in words and numbers only, ar-
ticulated by a single nondramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and with no other
background sound, may be communicated on television. In the case of television, no
visual display shall be allowed except that allowed in print as articulated by the an-
nouncer. All such communications on radio and television, to the extent possible,
shall be made only in the geographic area in which the lawyer maintains offices or in
which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides. Any such information shall
be presented in a dignified manner.
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates, ad-
dresses and telephone numbers and the designation "lawyer," "attorney," "law firm"
or the like;
(2) Fields of practice, limitation of practice or specialization, but only to the
extent permitted by DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other scholastic
distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching positions;
(10) Memberships, offices and committee assignments in bar associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations and
societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
The Humphrey law firm purchased several commercially produced ad-
vertisements in which actors portrayed nonlawyers discussing harm
"caused by the negligence of another" and stressing the importance of
careful lawyer selection. The dramatization was followed by a voice that
identified the firm and indicated that the firm handled certain negligence
matters on a percentage basis. The commercials did not indicate poten-
tial client liability for costs. After three days of broadcasts, the state
ethics committee brought action to enjoin their continued use. 78
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges to the
rule and issued a permanent injunction. Several prior United States
Supreme Court decisions, including Bates, had recognized the "special
problems" presented by electronic media, and its uniquely pervasive
presence.1 79 The court reasoned that because of the potential for decep-
tion, the state has greater latitude in regulating television advertising.
Bates only "condemned restrictions on the flow of 'relevant information
needed to reach an informed decision,' "but did not forbid prohibition of
irrelevant information."' 0 The disciplinary rule directly fostered a sub-
stantial state interest by aiding citizens to make rational and intelligent
selection of counsel.181 The court summarily dismissed Humphrey's
claim that the prohibition against background sound, visual displays, and
dramatic and self-laudatory statements were more extensive than neces-
sary to serve substantial interests. "All that is prohibited are the tools
which would manipulate the viewer's mind and will." ' 2
Two justices vigorously dissented. They argued that the legal pro-
fession must accept reality: lawyer advertising is here to stay, and it has
constitutional dimensions. The majority incorrectly improvised on the
fourth prong of Central Hudson by upholding a prohibition on the mere
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Subject to DR 2-103, prepaid or group legal services programs in which the
lawyer participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Race, sex, religion or ethnic background. Nothing contained herein shall
prohibit a lawyer from permitting the inclusion in repfitable law lists and law directo-
ries intended primarily for the use of the legal profession of such information as
traditionally has been included in these publications.
Additional restrictions are contained in subsections (C) through (I).
178. The FrC, National Ass'n of Broadcasters and Iowa Broadcaster's Ass'n appeared as
amicus curiae. 355 N.W.2d at 565-66.
179. Id. at 569.
180. Id. at 570 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. 350).
181. Id. at 571.
182. Id.
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chance of deceit.1 13 The content restriction improperly prohibits the flow
of basic information necessary for informed judgment about lawyer selec-
tion, while restrictions on technique amount to a prescription for dull-
ness, since they prohibit accepted methods of stimulating viewer
interest."' 4 The ethics committee's own expert testified that these ads
were not misleading and that there was no history or experience showing
that this particular form of advertising was subject to abuse.185 The
state's interest in facilitating informed lawyer selection was used in Bates
to expand the scope of lawyer advertising, "not to throttle it." 186 Finally,
they argued, except for the proscription of false or misleading advertis-
ing, the Iowa rule was unconstitutional.1 8 7
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded
for further consideration in light of Zauderer.1 8 1 On remand, the Iowa
Supreme Court reaffirmed, finding nothing in Zauderer at variance with
its decision." 9 The Court's earlier belief that Bates reserved the unique
problems of electronic broadcasts was borne out in the Zauderer major-
ity's careful references to "printed advertising" and the dissent's reitera-
tion that the broadcast media issues are reserved for later.19 0 Based on
the record below, electronic advertising remains closer to in-person solic-
itation which can be proscribed than to printed advertising.19' The chal-
lenged rule is not an outright ban, such as the illustration ban in
Zauderer, but merely a regulation of an advertising form that is ripe for
abuse.' 92 The Supreme Court dismissed Humphrey's next appeal only
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 573 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)) (history of deception with
use of trade names in Texas); see In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982).
186. 355 N.W.2d at 575.
187. Id. at 576.
188. 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985) (decided June 10). Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor would
have noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument.
189. 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985) (decided Nov. 13). The positions of the dissenting jus-
tices were either solidified or adjusted in response to Zauderer. In a special concurrence, three,
including the chief justice, expressed their "deep philosophical concern" for the future of state
courts if Zauderer is extended to the "inevitable machinations" of television advertising with-
out the safeguards provided by the disciplinary rule. Id. at 647-48 (Reynoldson, C.J., concur-
ring specially). The two prior dissenters maintained that the quoted language from Bates was
not intended as a license to apply substantially different rules to television advertising. Id. at
654 (Carson, J., dissenting). Now Justice Uhlenhopp joined in the dissent, reluctantly con-
cluding that because the Supreme Court "takes quite a broad view of constitutionally protected
lawyer advertising," the challenged rules should be invalidated. Id. at 654 (Jhlenhopp, J.,
dissenting). An appeal petition was filed with the Supreme Court. 54 U.S.L.W. 3565.
190. 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2277, 2294 n.l (1985).
191. Id. at 2277.
192. 355 N.W.2d at 569.
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two months after it was filed.
Undoubtedly there are significant differences between broadcast and
print media. Visual displays and dramatizations leave more to the recipi-
ent's interpretation than do printed words and symbols. Nevertheless,
the FTC has previously demonstrated the capacity to evaluate which tel-
evision ads are false or misleading, and which are not.193 Iowa's prohibi-
tion against specified ways to communicate the commercial message
virtually destroys the potential effectiveness of a televised advertising ef-
fort. Because there can be neither visual display, nor use of the lawyer's
voice, the viewing public is deprived of valuable information for selecting
a lawyer: the nuances of self-expression which the printed word cannot
convey. The public cannot learn of the lawyer's voice or manner of
dress. Viewers cannot determine whether the lawyer's message is tradi-
tionally delivered, in a law office filled with books or fancy office equip-
ment, or whether, for example, it is humorously delivered to the tune of a
badly played banjo.194
Prohibiting the lawyer's participation and any dramatization appar-
ently limits commercials to a simple announcement, with any print over-
laying a plain background. As argued by the Humphrey dissent, this
merely assures dullness. The lawyer's advertising dollar is not put to
effective use, it is simply wasted; after once tolerating sixty seconds of
boredom, the American viewing public will leave the room for refresh-
ments or other activities. Certainly that is not the type of time, place or
manner restriction envisioned by the Supreme Court in reserving for
later consideration the "special problems" of electronic broadcast adver-
tising. Although there may be greater opportunity for deception with
visual displays and dramatizations, an outright ban on their use is not a
narrowly drawn regulation which directly advances the state's substan-
tial interest in fostering intelligent lawyer selection. Thus, the commer-
cial speech doctrine should properly uphold stricter regulation of
broadcast advertising if narrowly designed to promote the important
state interest of providing the public with truthful information, but not
its blanket prohibition.
A similar outcome could be expected using the rule of reason test of
antitrust law. The Iowa restriction might have some procompetitive ef-
fect. Visual images can make misleading suggestions that could escape
193. See id. at 571.
194. Ken Hur, who previously practiced law in Wisconsin and now is a consultant for
lawyer advertising, has produced a series of humorous commercials, including one with him
badly playing the banjo and assuring clients that he was better at law. In another, Hur
emerges from a lake with bejeweled arms to the tune of "Dance of the Sugar Plum Fairy."
(Tapes on file with author.)
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regulatory scrutiny, even though the same message, if written, might
never survive agency review.1 95 By restricting the use of visual images,
the Iowa regulations protect consumers from misleading advertisements.
The effects that promote competition, however, are outweighed by those
which impede competition. Like any restriction of advertising, the Iowa
regulations decrease the flow of free information in the market place.196
Because visual images are effective aids to expression,1 97 the prohibition
of their use prevents attorneys from fully communicating to consumers
information necessary to informed attorney selection. The restrictive na-
ture of the Iowa regulations makes it difficult for attorneys to rely on
important advertising tools, such as comparative advertising. Truthful
comparative advertising, in which advertisers compare their own prod-
ucts, services or prices to those of their competitors, is viewed by the
FTC as promoting public awareness of product information and there-
fore rational purchase decisions. 198 In turn, the increased buyer sophisti-
cation that results from advertising can serve to reduce prices.199 Given
the preponderance of the restrictions' anticompetitive effects over their
procompetitive effects, they would be even more vulnerable to antitrust
attack than to commercial speech scrutiny.
b. Direct Mail Solicitation
Direct mail solicitation is typically regulated by states' post-Bates
amendments. Most current or pending ethical rules would permit law-
yers to send letters to the general population, but not to persons who may
have an immediate need for specific legal services. 2° Comments to the
Model Rules contend that there is no less restrictive means of policing
misleading or overbearing representations than an outright ban of direct
mail solicitation; no other efforts would be practically effective.201
This view is not unanimously accepted. The Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have argued
195. Richards & Zakia, Pictures: An Advertiser's Expressway Through FTC Regulation, 16
GA. L. REV. 77, 78-80 (1981).
196. See Pridgen & Preston, Enhancing the Flow of Information in the Marketplace.: From
Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacy at the Federal Trade Commission, 14 GA. L. REV. 635,
670-71 (1980).
197. Richards & Zakia, supra note 193, at 77-80.
198. Lee, Comparative Advertising, Commercial Disparagement and False Advertising, 71
THE TRADE-MARK REP. 620, 621 (1981); see also 8 ADVERTISING L. ANTHOLOGY 681.
199. See Khactu, Advertising, Market Power and the Public Interest: The Lawyer's Case, 55
N.D.L. REV. 525, 548-50 (1979); G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, 3 THE LAW OF ADVERTISING
46-10 to 46-11 (1985).
200. MODEL RULES, Rule 7.3 (1983). See also The Florida Bar, 438 So. 2d 371 (Fla.
1983).
201. MODEL RULES, Rule 7.3 (1983) (comment).
520
for changes that would allow direct mail solicitation that is sent to
targeted audiences. 202 Moreover, at least two federal courts and several
state courts have afforded constitutional protection to such mailings.
203
Direct mail solicitation to persons known to need a type of service
offered by the lawyer is a cost effective way to advertise. Because the
commercial message is given only to persons who realistically might be-
come clients, no transaction costs are wasted by communicating with un-
interested persons. Technology enables businesses to obtain information
identifying the target group and then facilitates the preparation of per-
sonalized letters sent to individuals in the group. Lawyers' efforts to ob-
tain new clients in their practice areas could be a cost effective way to
match prospective clients with lawyers who are skilled in the particular
field.
Opposition to direct mail solicitation tends to be both emotional and
practical. Persons charged with drunk driving may be highly offended to
learn their arrest has been discovered by others, even by lawyers offering
to help. Families of mass disaster victims, the lay public, and many in
the legal profession are often repulsed when lawyers swarm around the
injured like buzzards. This invasion of privacy and offense to sensibilities
is somewhat lessened when the offer of assistance comes by mail, rather
than in person or by telegram. Further, a business entity might welcome
hearing of a new, aggressive firm offering precisely the type of services it
202. Letter from J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, to State Supreme Court Justices 4-6 [hereinafter cited as McGrath
letter] (Sept. 21, 1984); Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission, Improving Consumer
Access to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions On Truthful Advertising 159-63
[hereinafter cited as FTC Staff Report].
203. See, e.g., Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, No. 84 C 3548,
slip op. (N.D. III. Aug. 15, 1985) (preliminary injunction granted); Spencer v. Honorable Jus-
tices of Supreme Court of Pa., 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (declaratory judgment); Leoni
v. State Bar of Cal., 152 Cal. App. 3d 302, 702 P.2d 583, 217 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985), appeal
dismissed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3560 (Feb. 24, 1986) (sustained discipline for misleading representa-
tions); Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 27,470 A.2d 235 (1984) (blanket prohibitions
to third party, non-clients invalid); In re Teichner, 75 Ill. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265 (1979) (in-
person solicitation for pecuniary gain constitutionally protected because leaders of community
disaster relief effort invited lawyer's assistance; associational rights involved); In re Appert,
315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981) (held unconstitutional bans on statements not false, fraudulent,
deceptive or misleading); In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838 (1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985) (blanket prohibition invalid, but sanctions for deceptive state-
ments sustained). But see The Florida Bar, 438 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1983) (adopting amend-
ment to the Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-104 which, inter alia,
prohibits a communciation "prompted by a specific occurrence affecting the person to whom
the communication is directed, or a member of his family, in a manner distinct from the effect
on the general public." DR 2-104(B)(2)(e)); In re Alessi, 60 N.Y.2d 229, 457 N.E.2d 682,
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984) (direct mail to realtors constitutionally prohibited because
legitimate state interest in preventing conflict of interest).
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needs. Nevertheless, traditional lawyer aversion to overt solicitation
evokes a visceral cry for an absolute ban rather than narrowly drafted
distinctions between offensive and inoffensive solicitation.
Practically, there may be real enforcement problems. Disciplinary
agencies are notoriously understaffed and overworked. Limited staff time
would be better spent policing more serious problems rather than screen-
ing all letters that lawyers propose sending to prospective clients or even
reviewing them after the fact. Further, agency staff may not know
enough underlying facts to determine whether a letter is deceptive or
misleading.2"
Notwithstanding these difficulties, states arguably may be required
to permit direct mail solicitation, which falls somewhere between Ohralik
and Primus. Chralik demonstrates that in-person, coercive solicitation
can be prohibited." 5 By contrast, the recipient of a letter as in Primus is
not pressured into an immediate decision, but has an opportunity for
careful reflection and response. Also, there is permanent evidence for
later review should a question arise as to ethical propriety. With near
unanimity, recent opinions have invalidated total bans of targeted direct
mail solicitation.0 6
Although the state probably cannot prohibit direct mail solicitation,
it retains regulatory power to enact limited content restrictions for mis-
leading or deceptive representations, 20 7 and reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions. As suggested in In re R.MJ., the state can require
disclosure on the envelope that "This is an advertisement." 208 The recip-
ient can therefore avoid an assault on sensibilities by discarding the let-
ter. The state might also consider restricting communications to the
emotionally susceptible.20 9 The state might, for instance, require a rea-
sonable recuperation period before permitting communication with acci-
dent victims and their families, who may need to take time to consider
204. See, e.g., Leoni v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985),
appeal dismissed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3560 (Feb. 24, 1986) (mass computerized mailing to civil de-
fendants concerning possible need for bankruptcy protection; efforts to particularize letter for
recipient often rendered message misleading in light of underlying facts).
205. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
206. See supra note 203.
207. Leoni v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985), appeal
dismissed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3560 (Feb. 24, 1986); In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d
838 (1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3869 (June 10, 1985).
208. In re R.M.J., 405 U.S. at 206 n.20; Spencer v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Ct. of
Pa., 579 F. Supp. at 890.
209. McGrath letter and FTC Staff Report, supra note 200. Their proposed language was
based on the MODEL RULES (Proposed Final Draft 1981). This language was rejected by the




the possibility of legal action.21°
c. In-Person Solicitation
Although direct mail solicitation may slowly gain acceptance, in-
person solicitation may never be acceptable to many in the profession.
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Primus, however, takes an anti-
trust-type approach in suggesting that benign, in-person solicitation
might be constitutionally protected. Marshall begins by attempting to
provide some principled distinctions between Chralik and Primus. He
stresses the limited holding in Ohralik that the solicitation of business
under the circumstances established in the record presented substantial
dangers of harm that the state could constitutionally prohibit."' States
redrafting solicitation rules, however, should note that the Court did not
address "benign" commercial solicitation-"solicitation by advice and
information that is truthful and that is presented in a noncoercive,
nondeceitful, and dignified manner to a potential client who is emotion-
ally and physically capable of making a rational decision" concerning
representation of a nonfrivolous claim. 12
Justice Marshall rejected any suggestion in Ohralik that advertising
and solicitation, as different forms of commercial speech, should receive
different levels of constitutional scrutiny.2 13 Both forms of speech serve
similar First Amendment interests and deserve the same level of protec-
tion under the commercial speech doctrine.214 He conceded, however,
that in-person solicitation presents greater dangers that the state can seek
to avoid.215
Justice Marshall also examined the market effects of nonsolicitation
rules, which have a discriminatory impact on both the consumers and
suppliers of legal services. The assumption that informal word of a law-
yer's reputation is sufficient to attract clients would be valid only for "rel-
210. The rule revisions proposed by the FTC and the Justice Department's Antitrust Divi-
sion are content regulations in that they prohibit communications under circumstances where
a lawyer's communication is likely to be coercive, overbearing or an invasion of privacy, espe-
cially when the recipient is probably emotionally susceptible. If such a "healing period" were
enacted, there would have to be some commensurate protection for the victims from speedy
insurance adjusters. See, eg., In re Teichner, 75 Ill. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265 (1979).
211. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 472-73.
212. Id. at 473 n.3. See, eg., MODEL RULES Rule 7.3(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981),
which prohibits contact with a prospective client concerning employment if (1) the lawyer
knows that the person is unable to exercise sound judgment; (2) the person demonstrates to the
attorney a desire not to receive communication from the attorney; or (3) the communcication
involves coercion, duress, or harassment.
213. 436 U.S. at 474 n.5.
214. Id. at 474.
215. Id. at 474 n.5.
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atively elite social and educational circles in which knowledge about legal
problems, legal remedies, and lawyers is widely shared." 216 Nonsolicita-
tion rules deprive primarily the less privileged consumers of useful infor-
mation. Similarly, the rules appear to have the greatest impact on solo
practitioners and small firms, as compared to larger corporate-oriented
firms.217 Given the rules' origin218 and impact, he doubted whether
states had sufficiently compelling interests to justify restricting the free
flow of information when those interests could be well served "by more
specific and less restrictive rules than a total ban on pecuniary
solicitation."21 9
By shifting the analysis from simple disdain for Ohralik's conduct
and respect for Primus' pro bono activities to the underlying commercial
speech issue, Justice Marshall reminds us that solicitation, as a form of
commercial speech, is constitutionally protected and subject to the same
type of scrutiny given print advertising in Bates. In doing so, he returns
to the antitrust-type concern for maximizing consumer welfare that was
evident in the Bates decision.
The legal profession and its regulators must trust that consumers
have the capacity to make rational decisions about securing legal repre-
sentation when they receive truthful, noncoercive information about
available legal services. Regulations depriving consumers of useful infor-
mation cannot be justified by traditional disdain for lawyers who need to
make personal contacts in order to become viable competitors in the legal
marketplace. Paternalistic attitudes that consumers are incapable of
making rational choices do not justify a ban on in-person solicitation.
There should be constraints only on those communications made under
coercive circumstances or those indicating that a particular consumer
lacks rational decision-making capacity. Unsavory solicitation might be
policed by means less restrictive than an outright ban; for example, by
application of such contract principles as fraud, undue influence, and
unconscionability.
Justice Marshall's opinion demonstrates that the status of antisolic-
itation rules under the commercial speech doctrine remains uncertain
even after Ohralik and Primus. While the majority seems content to con-
sider incidents involving solicitation on a case-by-case basis, the commer-
216. Id. at 475.
217. Id.
218. It has been argued that the rules were promulgated by established members of the bar
to restrain competitive activity of second generation immigrant lawyers bringing personal in-
jury claims. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 42-62, 126-29 (1976) (cited in Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
219. 436 U.S. at 476.
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cial speech approach gives no notice to attorneys of the propriety of
solicitation "falling between the poles"220 of political nonpecuniary solic-
itation and coercive commercial solicitation. Antitrust principles might
yield more certain results.
Solicitation has received antitrust protection in other professional
contexts. Mardirosian v. American Institute ofArchitects, 2  for instance,
involved ethical restrictions of the AIA, which prohibited member archi-
tects from soliciting prospective clients under contract to other members
for architectural services.222 The court applied the rule of reason to the
ethical standard in question 2 3 and found significant anticompetitive ef-
fects without significant procompetitive benefits.224 The AIA argued
that the standard was designed to prevent professional deception and
conflicts of interest. Although sympathetic to the argument, the court
found it unrelated to competition and therefore inappropriate for consid-
eration under the rule of reason.225
Similar protection might be extended to solicitation by lawyers if the
rule of reason were applicable. Solicitation has numerous procompetitive
effects. First, it promotes competition by enabling the large number of
today's underemployed attorneys 26 to obtain clients and stay in practice.
This competitive pressure on the marketplace may result in increasingly
high standards for the quality of legal work.227 In addition, solicitation,
which permits the free flow of information about the law between lawyer
and consumer, may enhance competition by increasing the demand from
clients familiar with legal issues and the legal process. Finally, solicita-
tion can benefit the consumer by tailoring legal services and information
to the needs and interests of the individual.22 8
220. Id. at 472.
221. 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1979).
222. Id. at 645.
223. Id. at 639.
224. Id. at 647, 648.
225. Id. at 648; see also American Medical Ass'n v. FrC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affid
by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982) (permitting nonoppressive solicitation by
physicians); United States v. Association of Eng'g Geologists, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCII) 1
66,349 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (consent decree enjoining trade association's regulation of solicitation,
advertising and price competition); United States v. Alaska Bd. of Registration for Architects,
Engineers, and Land Surveyors, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 66,423 (D. Alaska 1984) (en-
joining application of trade association rules of conduct to prohibit competitive bidding and
price competition); Opinion of the Att'y Gen. of Vermont, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCII) 62,912
(1979) (predicting that antisolicitation rules of professional accountants association would un-
reasonably restrain trade except under limited circumstances).
226. G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, supra note 199, 46-9, at n.37.
227. Id. at 46-9.
228. Id. at 46-24.1.
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Whatever benefits solicitation may confer, it also has potential an-
ticompetitive effects. Coercive pressures may force clients into making
hasty or uninformed decisions. A client with an urgent legal problem
may decide to forego shopping for legal services and retain the soliciting
lawyer. Further, the lawyer may engage in misrepresentation or fraud,
structuring the client's case in such a way as to maximize his own gain
and minimize his effort at the expense of the client's rights and competi-
tion from other attorneys.
On balance, antitrust would extend some protection to solicitation.
Where there is a strong possibility of fraud, misrepresentation, or over-
reaching, the anticompetitive effects of solicitation would outweigh its
procompetitive effects. The rule of reason would thus permit regulation
of this coercive form of solicitation. However, regulation of benign com-
mercial solicitation, where there is little chance for abuse, would have
more anticompetitive than procompetitive effects. Hence, the rule of rea-
son would protect benign commercial solicitation.
The commercial speech doctrine is unlikely to extend any protection
to commercial solicitation by lawyers, benign or otherwise. Reluctance
to extend this protection may be attributable to enforcement difficulties
and concerns bordering on paternalism, that the average consumer is in-
capable of making a free choice when subjected to the persuasive prowess
of the lawyer. In addition, reluctance may stem from concerns for pro-
fessionalism-some might say snobbery229-despite Bates' protestations
to the contrary. Whatever the motivation, it is unlikely that commercial
speech restrictions of commercial solicitation will be lifted. Justice Mar-
shall's opinion warns, however, that prohibiting all forms of benign solic-
itation based on this interpretation may be constitutionally infirm.
II. Significance Of Doctrinal Choices
In many ways, antitrust analysis and the commercial speech doc-
trine have more similarities than differences and often yield similar re-
sults when applied to lawyer advertising and solicitation. The
commercial speech doctrine protects advertisements that are truthful and
not misleading. Because this type of advertising also promotes competi-
tion, it is protected under antitrust analysis as well. Antitrust principles
appear to protect benign commercial solicitation, while the commercial
speech doctrine protects only political, nonpecuniary solicitation. How-
ever, coercive solicitation may be prohibited under both analyses. Con-
duct related to government also receives similar protection under each
229. Id. at 46-02[1].
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theory. The commercial speech doctrine prohibits regulation of political
information, the free exchange of which is essential to the success of a
democratic government. The conduct of a state acting in a governmental
capacity is exempt'from antitrust review.
The similarity of result arises from similarity in the premises under-
lying each view: protection of consumers. Antitrust law serves the best
interests of consumers by ensuring competition, which can lower prices
and increase the quality of goods and services. Consumer protection is
also an important component of the commercial speech doctrine. By
protecting the free flow of consumer information, which necessarily re-
quires protection of advertising, the commercial speech doctrine pro-
motes product, price, and quality competition, the same elements which
underlie antitrust's concern for consumer wealth. By permitting regula-
tion of misleading or deceptive commercial speech, the doctrine again
protects the consumer, even at the expense of the speaker.
Although antitrust and commercial speech have much in common,
they also differ in some respects. The most obvious difference is proce-
dural: antitrust law may in some ways be easier to enforce. First, a
number of different parties may bring antitrust actions, including the Jus-
tice Department, the FTC, and even private parties, including consumers
injured by anticompetitive conduct. Thus, attorney advertising restric-
tions would be scrutinized by a wide range of interested parties if anti-
trust were applicable. Because treble damage awards are sometimes
available for antitrust violations, private parties may be motivated to ex-
amine the restrictions with special care. Under commercial speech prin-
ciples, the only parties able to challenge advertising restrictions would be
those whose speech is regulated-the lawyer-advertiser. Further, since
treble damage awards are not available under the commercial speech
doctrine, the incentive to examine speech restrictions closely may be re-
duced. In short, by foreclosing antitrust review of speech restrictions,
integrated state bars-and the legal elite who benefit by the restrictions-
are able to reduce the number and intensity of challenges to regulation of
solicitation and advertising.
The two theories also differ in focus: antitrust analysis examines the
marketplace and related economic and competitive activities, while the
commercial speech doctrine looks more closely at policies relating to
speech. Commercial speech takes into account not only the interests of
the listeners-consumers-but also the rights of the speaker-the law-
yer. Commercial speech regulation requires a careful weighing of the
respective interests of speaker and state. Thus, crime prevention, pri-
vacy, abortion policy, racial integration, child rearing, and aesthetics all
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may be significant to the inquiry.230 Although the market analysis re-
quired under antitrust is complex, it does not consider such a wide range
of policies.
Although commercial speech may cover the broader range of poli-
cies, antitrust covers the broader range of behaviors. The commercial
speech doctrine, as its name implies, extends only to speech related be-
haviors. Antitrust, by contrast, considers any behaviors that affect com-
petition unless those behaviors are exempted; for instance, by the state
action exemption.231
Overall, the public interest in maximizing consumer welfare without
unduly infringing on legitimate self-regulation is well served by the doc-
trinal choices the Supreme Court has made, assuming that commercial
speech is constitutionally protected. For jurisprudential concerns related
to the First Amendment, it is preferable that the Court encourage com-
petitive conduct by all professions through antitrust doctrine. Perhaps it
would result in slightly less vigorous competition for new business in the
legal marketplace,232 but that tradeoff may be necessary to prevent dilut-
ing the protection given core First Amendment rights. 233
230. E. ROME & W. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 121 (1985).
231. Antitrust has been applied to such diverse behaviors as price-fixing, United States v.
Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); conspiracy, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); group
boycotting, United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); patent misuse, United
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); and the practice of booking films in cinemas,
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
232. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1980s: A PROGRESS
REPORT ON THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION LEADERSHIP OC-
TOBER 1982 TO OCTOBER 1984 41-59 (Oct. 1984).
233. Despite the broad application of antitrust policies to conduct in other fields, attorney
commercial speech has been one of the few areas of legal ethics in which antitrust analysis has
even been considered. But cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (mandatory
bar dues found to be price-fixing). The FTC has brought antitrust actions against lawyers for
anticompetitive group boycotts. See FTC, Press Release, Judge Dismisses FTC Antitrust
Complaint Against D.C. Trial Lawyers, Citing "Special Circumstances" (Oct. 25, 1984).
Because other areas of legal conduct have been less directly affected by antitrust law,
lawyers may be less concerned with antitrust actions than members of other professions.
Although the legal profession's naturally competitive nature may compensate somewhat for
the relatively relaxed antitrust supervision, the question remains as to the impact full antitrust
review might have on competition between lawyers. To answer that question, it may be useful
to compare the legal profession to the medical profession, which has already felt the effects of
antitrust review. A full comparison of the two professions, their entry barriers, structures of
practice, and their relation to antitrust and commercial speech law is beyond the scope of this
Article. Such an in-depth examination could be valuable in determining the practical impact
of the doctrinal choice on the respective professions. The discussion that follows is merely a
starting point in that analysis.
The medical profession has been subject to antitrust review for some time. In 1943, the
Supreme Court affirmed a lower court finding that the American Medical Association had
violated antitrust law by expelling from its membership physicians who participated in a
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III. Improving Access to Legal Services
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states the gen-
eral, axiomatic principle that a "lawyer should assist the legal profession
health maintenance organization. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519
(1943). Since then, the medical profession has faced a number of antitrust challenges on vari-
ous grounds: for conspiracy to restrain trade, Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County
Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal. 2d 201, 272 P.2d 497 (1954); for boycott activities, see, e.g., Feminist
Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammed, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976); and even for
anticompetitive advertising restrictions, American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d
Cir. 1980), affid by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). Concern for the antitrust
implications of medical practice is reflected by the amount of material written on the subject.
See generally Symposium on the Antitrust Laws and the Health Services Industry, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 302-752 (1978).
The legal marketplace appears, on balance, more competitive than the medical market-
place. There are at least three apparent reasons for this difference. First, there are more law-
yers than doctors per capita. Second, entry barriers in the legal profession are lower than those
in the medical profession. Third, the demand for legal services is less than for medical services.
Between 1970 and 1980, new entrants have swelled the ranks of both professions, which in
turn has promoted competition for available business. The more dramatic change has been in
the lawyer population, however, which increased by 53 percent, while the physician population
increased by only 40 percent. See B. CURRAN, K. ROSICH, C. CARSON & M. PUCETrI, THE
LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES LEGAL
PROFESSION IN THE 1980's 4 (1985); BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1985 (105th ed. 1985) No. 157, at 102 and No. 160, at 104 [hereinafter cited
as CENSUS DATA]. In 1970, the population/service-provider ratio was 595/1 for physicians
and 572/1 for lawyers; in 1980 the ratios were 474/1 and 418/1, respectively. Id. Part of the
disproportionate increase seems due to an increase in the number of law schools or their stu-
dent body capacity in response to increased demand for admission. The number and capacity
of degree granting medical schools has remained much more constant in this time period. Id.
Law schools cannot be held solely responsible for the increased supply of lawyers. Be-
sides social and economic factors which increased the demand for legal education, the entry
barriers to establishing a legal practice appear significantly lower than those in the medical
profession. Only three years of graduate education are required for law, while four years of
graduate school plus up to eight years of specialist training are required for physicians. Note,
Student Workers or Working Students? A Fatal Question for Collective Bargaining of Hospital
House Staff, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 762, 780 (1977). There are additional entry barriers to the
various specialties even though specialization is increasingly important in modern medicine.
Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional Discipline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE L.J. 443, 472-
77. Moreover, the formal training period and licensure does not assure one an entry level
position as a physician; if suitable employment is not found, the costs of setting up a private
practice including equipment and malpractice insurance could be prohibitive. A solo practice
by a new law graduate is risky and involves some capital investment, but the initial capital
outlay is not as prohibitive. Once admitted to practice before the local courts, a new lawyer
can engage in a full range of general practice; referrals and cooperation from other lawyers is
invaluable, but not critical to survival. The new physician, however, is dependent on acquiring
staff privileges with local hospitals in order to be able to provide full client services. Havig-
hurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303,
309. Positive relations with other local physicians thus becomes essential for economic sur-
vival and not just helpful for referrals and shared expertise. See id. at 309-10.
Consumer demand for health care seemingly is less elastic than demand for legal services.
During the 1970's, annual physician visits remained relatively constant, ranging between 4.6
Spring 1986]
530 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:487
and 5.1 visits per year. CENSUS DATA, supra, at 104, No. 161. By contrast, the average adult
uses a lawyer only once or twice in a lifetime. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 185-86, 190 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as LEGAL NEEDS]; Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise:
A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1084, 1095 (1983). In 1977, only 66%
of respondents in one sample had had at least one professional contact with a lawyer. People
often do not recognize when they have a problem where a lawyer could help, or they ignore the
problem until it demands attention. B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE
MEANS: SOME PROBLEMS OF AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES 18-26 (1970) (demand for
legal services highly elastic). Unlike physical check-ups, preventive legal check-ups are not a
regular occurrence.
Because of these significant differences in supply and demand and in the organization of
professional practice, one cannot attribute any differences in levels of competition within each
profession simply to the application of antitrust or commercial speech doctrine. The next step,
then, is to consider the practical impact of doctrinal choice on each of the professions.
Significant differences exist both in the type of alleged anticompetitive activity scrutinized
and in procedural aspects of the scrutiny. Under antitrust law, the full range of professional
activity may be challenged as anticompetitive, whether the conduct is required by ethical rules,
an informal arrangement worked out among physicians, or a formal staffing decision made by
a hospital. Because anticompetitive activity occurs at diverse levels within the medical profes-
sion and is not primarily dictated by its ethical rules, this broad range of vulnerability is appro-
priate to further the public interest in maximizing consumer welfare. Formal and informal
entry barriers, financial arrangements with third party payors, and organizational forms of
practice all create opportunity for anticompetitive conduct in the medical profession. By con-
trast, because legal rules of conduct tend to be subject to the commercial speech doctrine
rather than antitrust law, only action by the state (or the bar association disciplinary commit-
tee as its agent) is vulnerable to challenge, and then only if the adopted rules or enforcement
activity relates to a lawyer's speech proposing a business transaction. Federal interference
with regulations of lawyer ethics is limited to those regulations that impede the free flow of
relevant commercial information: advertising, solicitation, trade names, and specialization.
Those are the primary areas where ethical rules tend to be anticompetitive, except perhaps for
rules relating to the unauthorized practice of law.
A greater number of parties can bring action against medical authorities or practitioners
on antitrust grounds than against bar authorities on commercial speech grounds. Health care
antitrust claims realistically can be brought by private parties (including other physicians), the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, or the FTC. Except for limited instances where
the per se doctrine applies, such as price fixing, the plaintiff seeking relief must show that the
conduct violates the rule of reason in that the anticompetitive tendencies outweigh any
procompetitive conduct. This necessitates proof of substantial, complicated issues including
market share, effect on competition and damages. Even if a plaintiff prevails under this difficult
standard, the decision may have limited impact if the challenged conduct related to private
parties, rather than formal ethical standards.
By contrast, only those rules of legal ethics that have been adopted by the states are
subject to constitutional challenge. As a practical matter, commercial speech claims will only
be raised by other lawyers, either in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief from allegedly
invalid rules, or in a defense to a disciplinary charge instituted by the state authorities. Mc-
Grath letter, supra note 200; FrC Staff Report, supra note 200; Calvani, An FTC Commis-
sioner's View of Regulating Lawyers, 70 A.B.A. J. 70 (1984). This limited procedural posture is
quite significant, because the state authorities have had the opportunity to avoid even this
limited vulnerability. In adopting the particular rules, the authorities could minimize the risk
of intrusion by drafting rules which impose narrow constraints on permissible commercial
speech, and then discipline only those lawyers whose communications are deceptive, mislead-
in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available." '234 Ethical Consid-
eration 2-1 identifies three difficulties in fulfilling this goal: educating the
public to recognize when they have a legal problem and the importance
of seeking assistance; facilitating the intelligent selection of a lawyer; and
enabling the public to obtain the services of competent counsel.235 Ironi-
cally, the attainment of this goal is impeded by restrictions on advertising
and client solicitation that restrain lawyers from effectively communicat-
ing with that portion of the public whose legal needs have gone unmet-
the "people of moderate means.
2 36
All lawyers engage in some marketing activities, whether through
public speaking, community activities, "rain-making" at 'social func-
tions,237 mass communications using print or broadcast media, or di-
rected mailings. The real debate over advertising and solicitation is
whether those lawyers whose marketing techniques have not yet been
authorized will be permitted to communicate with the large segment of
Americans not now represented by lawyers.
By restricting lawyers' ability to communicate with the public, regu-
lations on lawyer advertising and solicitation deny many consumers ac-
cess to our system of justice. They present barriers to the legal education
of the public and to overcoming public fear of legal prices, as well as to
identifying for prospective clients those attorneys who can provide com-
petence in a given field at a reasonable price.238 Until the legal profession
addresses these issues, as much as seventy percent of the American popu-
lation may have unmet, legitimate legal needs2 39 at a time when many
ing, or otherwise in violation of the narrow regulations permissible under the commercial
speech doctrine.
Perhaps as a trade off to this limited and voluntary vulnerability benefitting state bar
authorities, they bear the burden of establishing that the ethical restrictions are constitution-
ally permissible under Central Hudson. If, as suggested in Zauderer, state bars must make the
same refined distinctions as the FTC on false or misleading communications before a ban will
be sustained, this burden can be substantial. Moreover, the risk of an adverse decision that
invalidates either a specific provision or an entire disciplinary rule has at least state-wide conse-
quences. The downside risks are, however, limited because damage liability is not an issue.
234. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 2 (1981).
235. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-1 (1981).
236. See, ag., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-101, DR 2-102,
DR 2-103, DR 2-104, DR 2-105 (1981). The term "people of moderate means" is attributable
to B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 233, at 20.
237. These are all business-promoting activities authorized under the current rules, MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981). See also Galante, Firms Finding More
Value in Marketing, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 4 (brochures, client seminars and
newsletters now being used by large, corporate firms to attract or maintain business clients).
238. See B. CURRAN, LEGAL NEEDS at 228-37; FTC Staff Report, supra note 202, at 12-13
(citing B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 233, at 19-26).
239. ABA, REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1972).
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lawyers are underemployed.
The educational barrier could be overcome with informational ad-
vertising alerting the population to the types of assistance lawyers can
provide. Public service announcements sponsored by bar associations
might be effective. In some instances, direct solicitation of clients likely
to have a particular legal problem may be an effective way to educate
members of the public about their legal needs. The result would be the
stimulation of the elastic latent demand for legal services 2" and an in-
creased public awareness of hitherto unrecognized legal rights.
Advertising and benign solicitation may also allay consumers' price
fears. Truthful, nondeceptive information about the fee range for certain
standardized legal services and the fee basis for non-routine matters al-
lows the public to determine which of their legal problems are economi-
cally worth pursuing. Particularly when the need is discretionary, like
most legal services, this information may encourage the consumer to in-
quire further about available services and the service providers. Addi-
tionally, relaxed rules on advertising and solicitation would increase
price competition within the legal market, thus lowering the cost of legal
241services. Concerns that price information will be the single determina-
tive factor in lawyer selection appear unwarranted; consumer response to
lawyer advertising indicates they weigh factual and quality information
in addition to price.242 Advertising also tends to stimulate further in-
quiry about the lawyer's "reputation and other consumers' direct
experience. 243
This concern for reputation leads to a consideration of the third dif-
ficulty: how to match potential clients with competent lawyers at afford-
able costs. Traditional restrictions against advertising and solicitation
developed on the assumption that hard work, competence, and honesty
would produce good results, which in turn would enhance reputations
and increase clientele. That assumption, however, developed at an ear-
lier time, when communities were small and homogeneous, and word-of-
240. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 233, at 1092-93.
241. FTC Staff Report, supra note 202, at 135.
242. Id.
243. Id. (citing Lang & Marks, Consumer Response to Advertisements for Legal Services
An Empirical Analysis--1980, 8 J. ACAD. OF MARKETING Sci. 357 (1980)). This empirical
research substantiates the theoretical underpinnings of commercial speech doctrine, that per-
sons are rational consumers and the professions cannot justify withholding material, truthful
information on the paternalistic ground that the public cannot know what is for its ultimate
good. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68 (discussing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy); see also
Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 233, at 1099 (advertising merely provides starting point
for consumer to seek other information about lawyer; past failures to perform competently
result in harm to reputation).
mouth reputation had wider impact. The traditional assumption may
still operate within the smaller business community and among upper
income individuals who have regular contact with lawyers and can read-
fly communicate reputation information to each other.2 " Today, how-
ever, especially in large metropolitan areas, the legal and lay
communities are too diverse and isolated for informal sources to reach
the wide range of potential consumers. Unless the legal profession pro-
vides the middle and lower income population with easy access to infor-
mation about various lawyers-the services they provide, the quality of
their work, if verifiable, and.their fees-these consumers will be forced to
select legal representation on the basis of haphazard and often irrelevant
criteria.2 45 Further, these clients may lose important legal rights because
they are unable to understand the legal system, or even because they fear
it.
For consumers to gain information about those lawyers who are
competent to represent their needs on a cost-effective basis, lawyers must
be allowed to communicate directly with their prospective clients. In a
competitive market, acquired expertise enhances lawyer efficiency, which
benefits the client with lower prices. Efficiency is further increased by
economies of scale attained through standardization. Creative use of
computers, nonlegal support staff, and other technological innovations
make such standardization possible. But lawyers will incur the high
start-up costs required for such standardization only if it is cost-effective
in the long run; this requires a high client volume for routine services.2 46
It may be impossible for attorneys to generate enough client volume to
attain this expertise and economy unless they are allowed to contact po-
tential clients directly.
Recent empirical data supports the conclusion that liberal access to
mass advertising significantly decreases the fees charged for certain types
of legal services.247 Most legal services amenable to mass marketing
techniques are routine and standardizable, so that increased volume will
244. B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 233, at 128-35.
245. Modem consumers are used to easy access to information. Id. at 134. Before Bates,
when only basic yellow page listings were allowed, lawyer selection may have been based
purely on alphabetical order, and who was in the office when the consumer first called. I have
been offered employment as a result of chance meetings on buses and airplanes; although I
would like to think this is because I exude an aura of competence, humility forces me to admit
it is more probably because those persons did not have other easy sources of information about
lawyers competent to handle their problems.
246. See generally, Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 233, at 1107-09; FTC Staff Re-
port, supra note 202, at 135, 139-41; B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 233, at 44-56.
247. FTC Staff Report, supra note 202, at 109-20.
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enhance competition with a downward effect on prices,248 thus enhanc-
ing consumer welfare. Information regarding more individualized and
complex services is not as readily communicated through advertising.
However, even clients in need of these services can be contacted and edu-
cated through direct, noncoercive solicitation. Moreover, clients who are
willing to pay for costlier, individualized services are unlikely to cross
over to firms providing standardized services. Thus, firms that provide
individualized services are not competing for the same market as those
providing standardized services most amenable to mass marketing tech-
nique. New forms of marketing, which allow ever more personalized
communication, should be allowed to stimulate latent demand for legal
services, increasing both consumer welfare and the economic welfare of
currently underemployed lawyers.
No analysis of lawyer advertising and solicitation would be complete
without considering quality concerns. Opponents claim that pressure for
routinization will force attorneys to ignore individual differences among
their clients' legal problems. They assert that in order to maintain lower
prices, all problems will be pushed into a standard mold even though
they may require individualized attention. There are two responses to
this argument.
First, all lawyers have a duty to provide their clients with compe-
tent, timely, and loyal representation. Where services are provided
through a standardized system, that system must be able to detect
problems requiring individualized legal services. In those cases, the cli-
ent must be apprised of this need and a separate fee arrangement negoti-
ated for the additional services required. Ethical rules can properly
require the lawyer to advise of this possibility in order to avoid the "bait
and switch" tactics practiced by unscrupulous firms. If a firm does not
fulfill its duty of competent, loyal, and efficient representation, that defi-
ciency can be addressed adequately through ordinary disciplinary ac-
tions249 without unnecessary restrictions of communication.
Second, the legal profession must relinquish the paternalistic as-
sumption that it alone is capable of evaluating what is best for the lay
public. Consumers are accustomed to making rational economic choices
in their market decisions involving nonlegal goods and services. In fact,
the antitrust laws have mandated that nonlaw professions allow consum-
ers free choice in selecting their services. Consumers should also be per-
mitted this freedom when purchasing legal services. Obviously,
248. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 233, at 1100-07.
249. See, e.g., Mezrano v. Alabama State Bar, 434 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1983); In re Sekerez,
458 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. 1984).
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consumers are capable of choosing between high priced, luxury auto-
mobiles with advanced safety equipment, and economy models. There is
no reason to deny them a comparable choice among legal services. This
is especially true when higher prices might keep consumers from ob-
taining legal services altogether: economical justice is better than no jus-
tice at all. Adoption and enforcement of restrictive ethical rules
impeding the flow of relevant, nondeceptive information about available
legal services works against the legitimate goals underlying self-regula-
tion of the legal profession"' and the legal needs of the general public.
Conclusion
There is an ironic circularity to protecting lawyers' marketing com-
munications with commercial speech doctrine. Those segments of the
profession which dislike overtly commercial activities lobby for restric-
tive advertising and solicitation rules. Because those rules are adopted
and enforced by an entity of the state, they are exempt from antitrust
scrutiny designed to foster competition for the welfare of consumers.
Yet, that state action which qualifies these anticompetitive rules for the
antitrust exemption also brings about scrutiny on constitutional grounds.
The first amendment doctrine is necessarily focused on speech, not the
broad range of anticompetitive conduct scrutinized under antitrust law.
Consumer welfare is a primary value under both doctrines, although
commercial speech considers other, diverse values. Nevertheless, the
limited parties and procedural context result in greater focus on the sub-
stantive protection given commercial speech. And thus, the constitu-
tional doctrine fosters indirectly just that competitive activity which the
antitrust-exempt ethical rules were intended to inhibit.
250. Between 1924 and 1950, a disproportionate amount of enforcement resources were
devoted to policing anticompetitive ethical rules. See G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 290 (1985).
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